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19951 DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEMS
The world trading system must have a means of accommo-
dating regional economic integration schemes within the
multilateral framework, however contradictory the two sys-
tems appear to be.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Regional trade agreements are emerging at a rapid pace
worldwide.2 One impetus for this growth has been the expan-
sion and strengthening of the European Union (EU) in the past
few decades.3 The United States' (U.S.) express purpose in com-
pleting the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)4
was to improve export and investment opportunities for Ameri-
1. Jan Tumlir, Protectionism: Trade Policy in Democratic Societies, 1985 AM.
ENTER. INST. 228, quoted in Asif H. Qureshi, The Role of GATT in the Management
of Trade Blocs: An Enforcement Perspective, J. WORLD TRADE, June 1993, at 101.
2. This comment will focus on the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) and the European Union (EU). Examples of other regional trade
agreements include the Central American Common Market; the Caribbean Communi-
ty and the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States; Treaty Establishing a Common
Market or "Treaty of Asunci6n;" Andean Common Market; Latin American Integra-
tion Association; ASEAN Free Trade Area; Arab Common Market; Economic Coopera-
tion Organization; African Economic Community and The South African Customs
Union.
For a comprehensive list of worldwide regional trade agreements and a de-
tailed discussion of their emergence, see Joseph L. Brand, The New World Order of
Regional Trading Blocs, 8 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 155 (1992). See also Heinz G.
Preusse, Regional Integration in the Nineties, Stimulation or Threat to the Multilater-
al Trading System?, J. WORLD TRADE, Aug. 1994, at 147. Preusse argues that "con-
trary to the last wave of regional bloc-building in the 1960s, which has proved to be
a transitory phenomenon, this new tide is widely believed to become a lasting phe-
nomenon." He cites as one example the discussions at a 1992 World Bank Confer-
ence on "New Dimensions in Regional Integration." Id. at n.1.
3. The Treaty on European Union and Final Act (Maastricht Treaty), Feb. 7,
1992, 31 I.L.M. 247. The Treaty established the EU; its goals are political and eco-
nomic union including a single currency by 1999. Three new members, Austria, Fin-
land, and Sweden joined the EU on January 1, 1995. See generally Charles Gold-
smith, EU Decision-Making Process Could Drag Out Conference, WALL ST. J. EURO.,
June 6, 1995, at 2; John Arrowsmith, Economic & Monetary Union in a Multi-tier
Europe, 76 NAT'L INST. ECON. REV., May 1, 1995, available in WESTLAW, ALL-
NEWS database; Rick Atkinson & John Pomfret, East Looks to NATO to Forge
Links to West Series, WASH. POST, July 6, 1995, at Al; Wilbur G. Landrey, Danes
Vote "Yes" in Referendum on European Unity Series, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May 19,
1993, at 2A.
4. North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-
U.S., 32 I.L.M. 289 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994). The formation of NAFTA was
viewed by many as "a turning point in international trade relations confirming the
shift toward regional blocs." Preusse, supra note 2, at 148 n.2.
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can business enterprises.' The U.S., however, also had a hidden
agenda: to respond to developments involving the EU.s
When Europe moved towards a single European market in
the 1980s, much of the world became concerned that the Europe-
an Community (EC), now known as the European Union, would
become a protectionist bloc, a "Fortress Europe."7 There was
also concern that the EU would be less likely to engage in multi-
lateral trade liberalization under the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT).' Similarly, after the successful com-
pletion of the NAFTA, and the corresponding increase in enthu-
siasm for the Enterprise for Americas Initiative, countries out-
side the region began to suspect that "U.S. interest in regional
trade initiatives reflected a growing disenchantment with ongo-
ing multilateral negotiations under the auspices of the GATT."9
Since the GATT's formation, there has been considerable
debate as to whether regional integration promotes or hinders
free trade.' Some commentators have expressed concern that
regional protectionism could expand globally and eventually
result in world-wide economic warfare," or at least undermine
5. See Frederick M. Abbott, NAFTA and the Future of United States - Euro-
pean Community Trade Relations: The Consequences of Asymmetry in an Emerging
Era of Regionalism, 16 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 489 (1993).
6. Id.
7. See Preusse, supra note 2, at 148 n.5. Preusse notes that Mexican Presi-
dent Salinas pushed NAFTA further after a visit to Europe which "changed [his]
views on the reliability of European free trade proclamations." Id.
8. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 (entered into force Jan. 1,
1948) [hereinafter GATT 1947]. The GATT 1947 was replaced during the Uruguay
Round of multilateral trade negotiations by what is now referred to as the GATT
1994. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, 33 I.L.M. 29. [hereinafter
GATT 1994]. The GATT 1994 is now subsumed by the World Trade Organization
(WTO). For a thorough discussion of this change, as well as the other monumental
changes in the organizational structure of the GATT/WTO, see JEFFREY J. SCHOTT,
THE URUGUAY ROUND: AN ASSESSMENT (1994); Peter L.H. Van den Bossch, The
Establishment of the World Trade Organization: The Dawn of a New Era in Interna-
tional Trade, 1 MAASTRICHT J. EURO. & COMP. L. 396 (1994).
9. GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & JEFFERY J. SCHOTT, WESTERN HEMISPHERE ECO-
NOMIC INTERGRATION 159 (1994).
10. See John McMillan, Does Regional Integration Foster Open Trade? Economic
Theory and GATT's Article XXIV, in REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND THE GLOBAL TRAD-
ING SYSTEM 292 (Kym Anderson & Richard Blackhurst eds., 1993). For an earlier
discussion of this issue, see generally PIERRE LORTIE, ECONOMIC INTERGRATION AND
THE LAW OF GATT (1975).
11. See Brand, supra note 2, at 155, 169; Qureshi, supra note 1, at 101. See
also Panel Discussion, NAFTA-EFTA Any Role for NATO?, 14 N. ILL. U. L. REV.
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the progress that has been made in the context of the GATT.12
While most scholars reject the prophecy of world-wide economic
warfare, this debate suggests that in the new era of regionalism,
law and legal institutions must play a critical role in interna-
tional affairs, specifically with regard to the settlement of inter-
governmental trade disputes.13
505, 530 (1994). One member of the panel, Professor Robert L. McGeorge argued: "I
see the possibility that we will have four or five major blocs that are less interde-
pendent with each other, that are more hostile in terms of economic rivalries, and
again I look back at the interwar period and I see the same thing possibly happen-
ing." Id.
For a history of the breakdown of the international trade system during the
inter-war period which led to World War II, see GILBERT R. WINHAM, THE EVOLU-
TION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 25-42 (1992). Another author has ar-
gued:
Bluntly put, a series of regional trading blocs would be a recipe
for "RIBS," that is, resentment, inefficiency, bureaucracy, and stu-
pid signals. Resentment would be spawned among outsiders. Ineffi-
ciency would result from the fragmentation of markets, creating
more uncertainty for businesses that operate on a global basis.
Bureaucracy would increase because governments and businesses
would feel obligated to discover whether countries or blocs had
discriminatory policies that affected them. Finally, more regional
blocs would send stupid, or at least silly, signals to developing
country friends who are proponents of market-oriented solutions
and multi-lateralism.
C. Michael Aho, A Recipe for RIBS Resentment, Inefficiency, Bureaucracy, and
Stupid Signals, in THE GROWTH OF REGIONAL TRADING BLOCS IN THE GLOBAL ECON-
omy 22, 24 (Richard S. Belous & Rebecca S. Hartley eds., 1990).
12. See RESEARCH AND POLICY COMMITrEE OF THE COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT, THE UNITED STATES IN THE NEW GLOBAL ECONOMY: A RALLIER OF
NATIONS 31 (1992). The committee observed that "U.S. focus on regional economic
arrangements, the European Community's progress toward achieving a single re-
gional market, and Japan's increasing investment in Asia have fostered fears that
the three major economic powers will devote increased energy to developing integrat-
ed regional trading arrangements, at the expense of GATT." See also Panel Discus-
sion, supra note 11, at 529-530. One member of the panel, Professor Robert L.
McGeorge argued:
There is an uneasy coexistence in GATT's multilateral system be-
tween regional trade agreements and the multilateral trading
system .... [W]e are at an equilibrium stage, but I think there is
a danger that if we start to govern more of our trading rela-
tions with regional trade agreements, we upset that balance and
we endanger that multilateral system.
Id.; see also GILBERT R. WiNHAM, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREE-
MENTS 119 (1992) ("Prima facie, regional groups are a threat to the GATT because
they compromise universality and the non-discriminatory treatment of traded prod-
ucts."). Id.
13. See KEVIN FEATHERSTONE & ROY H. GINSBURG, THE UNITED STATES AND
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY IN THE 1990's 117 (1993). See also Preusse, supra note 2, at
159. Preusse concludes that "[w]hile traditional trade theory emphasizes the discrimi-
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Unlike general international law, which is founded on the
concept of state sovereignty, international economic law is based
upon the concept of economic interdependence." The GATT has
been the forum for managing this interdependence since World
War I.i The GATT has played a central role in the evolution
of international economic law, particularly in the area of inter-
governmental trade dispute resolution. 6
Some have argued that instead of pursuing trade liberaliza-
tion by way of multilateralism within the World Trade Organi-
zation (WTO)," that the United States' interests would be best
served by focusing on bilateral agreements with other nations
outside the WTO context. 8 This argument stems from the mis-
conception that regional integration and the evolution of the
mulitilateral trading system are mutually exclusive; that is, if
the regional integration agreements (RIAs) continue to widen
natory character of regionalization and points out the potential threat for the multi-
lateral trading system, new theoretical and empirical work on the dynamic effects of
economic integration supports a more positive view of regional trading arrange-
ments." In their assessment of a potential Western Hemisphere Free Trade Agree-
ment, Professors Hufbauer and Schott concluded that regional economic integration
"will complement and reinforce the objectives of the GATT system and will not pro-
mote the devolution of the world trading system into competing blocs." HUFBAUER &
SCHO~r, supra note 9, at 170 (1994).
14. See JOHN H. JACKSON & WILLIAM J. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 2, 1241 (1986) (The problem of international economic
law today is largely a problem of managing interdependence.). See generally ROBERT
0. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE: WORLD POLITICS IN
TRANSITION (1977).
15. See generally JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM (1990);
OLIVIER LONG, LAW AND ITS LIMITATIONS IN THE GATT MULTILATERAL SYSTEM 4
(1985) (The GATT is the only system which "provides in legal form a framework of
rules and procedures governing international ... trade relations and which
emobodies legal rights and obligations between its member countries."). Id.
16. Id.; ATLANTIC COUNCIL OF THE UNITED STATES, GATT PLUS - A PROPOSAL
FOR TRADE REFORM 5 (1976) (The GAIT is presently the only decision-making body
of global scope dealing with international trade problems.); LONG, supra note 15, at
5 ("[T]he GATT is at the same time a legal framework for the conduct of trade rela-
tions between its member countries, a forum for trade negotiations and for the adap-
tation of its legal framework, and an organ for conciliation and settlement of dis-
putes."). Id.
17. The most recent round of global trade negotiations, known as the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, concluded with 120 nations signing the
treaty creating the WTO. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade - Multilateral
Trade Negotiations (The Uruguay Round): Agreement Establishing the Multilateral
Trade Organization [World Trade Organization], Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 13 (1994).
18. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Schott, More Free Trade Areas?, in FREE TRADE AREAS
AND U.S. TRADE POLICY 1 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 1989).
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and deepen it will mean the demise of the multilateral trading
system embodied in the WTO. 9 However, this comment argues
that it is essential for RIAs to emerge within the framework of
the world trading system.0
Part II of this comment traces the historical development of
the GATT/WTO legal system and the underlying philosophical
debate that shaped the system's evolution over the past four
decades. Part III discusses the WTO's legal system that emerged
after the Uruguay Round. Part 1V discusses the uneasy relation-
ship between RIAs and Article XXIV of the GATT and makes
some suggestions for revisions to Article XXJV.
Part V of this comment argues that the further expansion of
RIAs and the greater liberalization of world trade may be entire-
ly compatible, even complimentary. It further argues that the
WTO must take a new approach to the management and resolu-
tion of disputes;21 it must adapt its legal system to account for
growing world-wide inter-regional relationships.
Part V then proposes a model of conflict management and
dispute resolution for the future which may better adapt to
global regionalism. This comment uses the relationship between
the NAFTA nations and the EU as a model for the proposed
theoretical framework. The foundational mechanisms embodied
in the NAFTA-EU model may then serve as a basis for a WTO
legal system that manages and resolves conflicts between the
multilateral entities formed by the RIAs (e.g., the EU and
19. See, e.g., Aho, supra note 11, at 24 ("Discriminatory [RIAs] are not building
blocks that can be stacked to create a stable multinational trading system. No one
could put them all together."). Id.
20. For purposes of this article, an RIA is a regional trade agreement which es-
pouses internal trade liberalization. RIAs may include free trade areas, customs
unions, common markets, and economic unions. See Brand, supra note 2. For an
introduction to the theories of international economic integration and the diferrences
between the various regional integration schemes, see generally MIROSLAV N.
JOVANOVIC, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION (1992).
21. One article posed the following questions:
1. "[Ils the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT], in so far as its
enforcement apparatus is concerned, premised merely on the notion of the individual
nation state, or is it equipped to deal with groups of States as well?"
2. Does "the new trading order contemplated under the Uruguay Round
[take] cognizance of trade blocs as subjects of that order?"
3. "[How] may the blocs be reined effectively to order[?]"
Qureshi, supra note 1, at 101. This comment answers the first two queries in the
negative and then suggests an answer to the third.
1995]
568 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:3
NAFTA) rather than individual member states. This comment
further argues that regional integration may result in the cre-
ation of about ten regional entities with institutional power, or
at least uniform external trade policies. These regional entities
would comprise the membership of the WTO, resulting in an
organization empowered to implement full trade liberaliza-
tion.2"
II. THE EVOLUTION OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE GATT
23
A. Introduction
The current system of economic interdependence originated
in the completion of the Bretton Woods System. The Bretton
Woods System includes the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
the World Bank, and the GATT. 4 Until the completion of the
Uruguay Round, the treaty comprising the GATT had never
22. The envisioned WTO framework will not force the creation of RIAs, rather
it will adapt to their existence. Within the proposed theoretical framework, there
may be nation-states that have not become members of any RIA, yet are still mem-
bers of the WTO. It is unlikely, however, that too many of these unaffiliated nation-
states will remain. As one author puts it, "regionalization is increasingly seen as
inevitable because existing arrangements are threatening to separate non-members
from the integrated markets." Preusse, supra note 2, at 149. This comment's pro-
posed model envisions that RIA members will be able to coexist with any remaining
nation-states within the context of the WTO.
23. The ensuing discussion of the development of the GATT legal sys-
tem is essential, 1) to put into perspective how much the current dispute
resolution mechanism has improved from a legal perspective, compared to
the DRMs of the past, and 2) to demonstrate that despite the system's sub-
stantial evolution over the past forty years, the GATT has never adapted to
the unique problems that RIAs pose to the world trading order.
24. The "Bretton Woods System" is a group of institutions and multilateral
agreements which are "[a]t the core of contemporary international regulation of eco-
nomic relations." JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 14, at 281. In July of 1944, the
leading nations of the world gathered in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire to reckon
with the economic lessons of World War II and the inter-war period. ROBERT E.
HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY 4-8 (1975). The
key lesson was that "the policy of trade restriction and discrimination had once and
for all been proved wrong." Id. At Bretton Woods, the world trading community
sought to implement global institutional reform directed at preventing the use of
trade restriction and discrimination. Id While the Bretton Woods System does not
technically include the GATT, most authors include it. See JACKSON & DAVEY, supra
note 14, at 2. See also JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, LAW AND
POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (1989); EDMOND MCGOVERN, INTER-
NATIONAL TRADE REGULATION: GATT, THE U.S. AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
(1986); LONG, supra note 15.
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come into force. 5 The GATT was applied by way of a 1947
"Protocol of Provisional Application" 6 which developed into the
strongest and most important multilateral economic treaty in
history27 due to the number of contracting parties2 8 and the
volume of trade regulated.29
The GATT was never intended to have institutional pow-
er.o It was meant to be one trade agreement within the context
of the International Trade Organization (ITO) Charter." When
the ITO failed to come into existence, the GATT was forced to
fill the institutional role originally held for the ITO.32 This,
however, was no easy task because the GATT lacked institution-
al and constitutional foundations." As a result, the GATT be-
gan to develop a number of flaws, many of which persisted
throughout its forty-five year existence. 4 Yet, the GATT devel-
oped into an international organization' serving as a forum for
25. See JACKSON, supra note 15, at 1.
26. Id.
27. See Miquel Montanhb I Mora, A GATT With Teeth: Law Wins Over Politics
in the Resolution of International Trade Disputes, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 103,
109 (1993).
28. On April 15, 1994, in Marrakesh, Morocco, more than 120 parties signed
the Uruguay Round's Final Act, which embodies the WTO. FIN. POST, Apr. 15, 1994,
at 3. The implementation of the various trade agreements concluded in the Final
Act is expected to generate $240 million in new economic activity worldwide. Id.
29. Four-fifths of all world trade took place within the GATT. LONG, supra note
15, at 6.
30. LONG, supra note 15, at 44. When it first came into being the General
Agreement in no way entailed, nor even implied, the creation of a complex inter-
national organization. The "CONTRACTING PARTIES" (or member states acting
jointly under the guise of the relevant GATT articles) were the only semi-institution-
al bodies envisioned when the General Agreement at tha time. Id. at 45. See also
GILBERT R. WINHAM, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 43-44
(1992).
31. See JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 43 (1969);
SCHOTr, THE URUGUAY ROUND: AN ASSESSMENT, supra note 8, at 133 (The GATT
was originally crafted as a reciprocal trade agreement that would eventually be
subsumed by the charter of the International Trade Organization).
32. LONG, supra note 15, at 11 ("With the failure of the Havana Charter, the
General Agreement stood on its own as an independent legal instrument.") Id.;
SCHOTr, supra note 8, at 133 (Because the ITO was never ratified, the GATT has
served in its place ever since).
33. SCHOTr, supra note 8, at 50-51.
34. A more elaborate discussion of these flaws appears in part II.C. For addi-
tional discussion, see John H. Jackson, The Birth of the GATT-MTN System: A Con-
stitutional Appraisal, 12 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 21, 32 (1980).
35. While some authors have argued that the GAIT is not an organization,
Professor Jackson, the preeminent scholar in this field, has stated, "look at what the
GATT is, what it is doing, and how it goes about its work and I say this is an
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multilateral trade negotiations, a dispute settlement body, and
the legal framework for the trade relations of its contracting
parties.36
The procedures established under the GATT for resolving
disputes between member nations were known collectively as
the Dispute Resolution Mechanism (DRM). The GATT DRM was
highly successful in its early years due to the homogeneity of the
GATT's initial contracting parties and their support of the GATT
rules.37 As years passed, the membership increased and the
original coherence of the post-war years began to dissipate. 8 As
a result, decision making became much more cumbersome as
parties' contradictory interests came to the forefront.39 More-
over, parties would often ignore a particular rule because the
GATT rules were so difficult to change."'
Parties sometimes permitted violations either because the
violation caused a relatively small impact on the system or be-
cause of a desire to show tolerance toward a developing party."'
At other times, it was simply impractical to enforce an adverse
ruling against a party that enjoyed disproportionate economic or
political power.42 These enforcement aspects led to a debate
over the proper method to resolve inter-governmental trade
disputes regarding the application or interpretation of GATT
rules as well as the general role of law in international trade
relations.
organization." John H. Jackson, GATT and Recent International Trade Problems, 11
MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 1, 8 (1987); See also Montafih I Mora, supra note 27, at
107-108.
36. See LONG, supra note 15, at 5.
37. MontatA I Mora, supra note 27, at 108.
38. Id.
39. Id.; ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 12 (1993)
(The change in the composition of GATT membership and the corresponding change
in policy agenda, produced a higher level of conflict which caused a sharp decline in
the status of GAIT law).
40. See JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 14, at 17.
41. See Montafib I Mora, supra note 27, at 109.
42. JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 14, at 758. One example of this was the
GATT waiver of United States agricultural import controls in 1955 which was an
apparent effort to bring "law into conformity with practice," that is to eliminate any
possible conflict between U.S. domestic law obligations and its obligations under the
GATT. Id., citing 3 BISD 1955. However, "it was rather clear to all concerned in
1955 that had the waiver not been granted the United States would have continued
its practice anyway." Id.
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B. The Philosophical Debate: Legalism Versus Pragmatism
Two conflicting viewpoints emerged in the debate over the
GATT DRM and the role of law in the system."3 On the one
hand, the "legalists" argued that the system should be more
judicial, centering on adjudication of disputes. They defended a
rule-oriented approach in the conduct of international trade
relations, arguing that such an approach would promote more
precise decisions on the merits of disputes and more effective
implementation of decisions."
On the other hand, those more skeptical of rules, the "prag-
matists," argued that the system should be used only to facili-
tate negotiated settlements of trade disputes.45 They concen-
trated on the process of consensus and compromise within the
general framework of rules which the GATT provided, although
the compromises did not have to be technically in accordance
with GATT "law." In the 1960s and 1970s, the decline in the use
of the GATT system reflected the influence of the pragmatists on
leading GATT officials and parties during that time.46
In dispute resolution, there is a dichotomy between the
power-oriented, anti-legalistic approach, which is based on "set-
tlement by negotiation and agreement with reference (explicitly
or implicitly) to the relative power status of the parties,"47 and
the rule-oriented approach which focuses on "settlement by ne-
gotiation or decision with reference to norms and rules to which
both parties have previously agreed."' In practice, the dis-
agreement between the EU, historically a major advocate of the
pragmatist approach, and the U.S., a defender of a more rule-
43. See JACKSON, supra note 15, at 49-54.
44. See, e.g., John H. Jackson, Governmental Disputes in International Trade
Relations: A Proposal in the Context of GATT, 13 J. WORLD TRADE L. 1 (1979).
45. See Montahf I Mora, supra note 27, at 110.
46. See, e.g., LONG, supra note 15, at 109 (Mr. Long was Director-General of
the GATT from 1968-1980); R. Phan van Phi, A European View of the GATT, 14
INT'L BUS. LAW 151 (1986) (Mr. Phan van Phi was formerly in charge of GATT re-
lations for the EU).
47. See JACKSON, supra note 15, at 51.
48. Id. The power-oriented approach assumes that the most powerful parties to
a negotiation have an advantage. By contrast, the weaker party will have to consid-
er other factors such as foreign aid, military maneuvers, or import restrictions on
other key goods by way of retaliation. Id. at 51-52.
1995]
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oriented philosophy, has been one of the most serious obstacles
in the development of the GATT DRM. 9
In the rule-oriented approach the negotiators argue about
the application of a specific rule to their dispute." They negoti-
ate with the knowledge that if their dispute is not resolved, an
impartial third-party will make a judgment based on the
rules.' Their negotiations are affected by their "respective pre-
dictions as to the outcome of those judgments and not with ref-
erence to potential retaliation or actions exercising power of one
of the parties to the dispute." 2
The arguments for the implementation of a rule-oriented,
legalistic approach, versus a pragmatist approach follow. The
most convincing argument for the rule-oriented approach is that
it causes parties to place "less reliance on raw power and the
temptation to exercise it or flex one's muscles, which can get out
of hand." 3 A rule-oriented approach also finds support in the
context of a prisoner's dilemma paradigm.'4 In situations akin
to international trade relations, parties often seek to maximize
their gains at the expense of other parties but often find that
opposing parties seek to do the same; this results in a loss for
both parties." The solution is to agree on a set of rules which
will restrain behavior in particular situations to ameliorate this
mutual loss." Jan Tumlir, former GATT Chief Economist, ex-
pressed his arguments for a 'rule-oriented constitution' for the
conduct of parties in trade relations:
The trade part of the international econom[icl order can thus
be understood as a set of policy commitments exchanges
between and among countries in order to minimize policy-
generated uncertainty and so to maximize the gains from
49. See MontanA I Mora, supra note 27, at 129.
50. JACKSON, supra note 15, at 51.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 53.
54. The prisoner's dilemma game has two players. Each player has two choices,
cooperation or defection. Each player makes a choice without any knowledge of the
other's decision. Defection yields a higher payoff irrespective of the other player's
choice. The dilemma arises because if both players defect, they are both worse off
than if they had cooperated. See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION
7-8, 206-07 (1984) for proof of the th6oretical proposition.
55. Id. at 7-8.
56. See JACKSON, supra note 15, at 55.
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trade .... Historically, this set of commitments evolved as a
series of contractual bargains .... Without the judge and
bailiff in the background, contracts do not mean much.1
7
Critics of the rule-oriented approach argue that it will "poi-
son the atmosphere."5 8 They believe that negotiated solutions to
disputes will promote conflict and contentiousness. 9 The need
for negotiation exists because parties will inevitably be involved
in diplomatic contacts regarding compliance with judgments."0
The legalist approach therefore is viewed as counterproductive
because it "poisons the atmosphere" in which these contacts take
place.6 They maintain that it is much more important to re-
solve the dispute than to pick the winner.
6 2
Another argument made against the rule-oriented approach
is that it will result in "wrong cases" being brought into the
GATT system.6 3 A wrong case has been defined "as a dispute
the resolution of which undermines the GATT trading sys-
tem."64 One example is the case where a country violates a
GATT rule but has done so because of unavoidable domestic
pressures." The pragmatists have argued that condemnation of
the violating party in this situation is unfair because the govern-
ment really had no choice in the matter, and is inappropriate
because domestic politics will prevent the government from
correcting the situation.6
57. Jan Tumlir, Gatt Rules and Community Law - A Comparison of Economic
and Legal Functions 6, 20, in THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND TIE GATT (Meinhard
Hilf et al. eds., 1986) cited in JACKSON, supra note 15, at 55.





62. See LONG, supra note 15, at 71. This argument is not compelling for sev-
eral reasons. First, the more the system is utilized, the more the parties will come
to realize that the dispute is 'nothing personal' - the dispute is directed at the
violation of the rule, not at the country itself. Further, as Jackson has argued, a
legalist approach would improve the atmosphere of the GATT by stressing fairness,
especially for the smaller, weaker parties. John H. Jackson, The Crumbling Institu-
tions of the Liberal Trade System, 12 J. WORLD TRADE L. 93, 98-101 (1978).
63. See Robert E. Hudec, GATT Dispute Settlement After the Tokyo Round, An
Unfinished Business, 13 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 145, 159 (1980).
64. Id. at 159.
65. Id.
66. Id. This argument is flawed for two reasons. First, there is nothing inap-
propriate about putting pressure on a country to correct its violation of GATT rules
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Clearly, a power-oriented approach hurts small developing
countries the most. The power-oriented approach, however, may
also be detrimental to the global trading system. For example, if
the EU and U.S. are engaged in a dispute, and both realize that
any dispute resolution body decision will not be binding on it,
each party might rely on its power position in a particular area.
This could result in a virtual game of poker, with each party
seeing how far it could bluff. The worst case would be that each
party might decide to fold and exit the game, which would pres-
age the demise of the WTO. The WTO's new DRM 7 adopts a
fundamentally legalist, rule-based approach to dispute resolu-
tion. 8
Part V of this comment proposes a model whereby each
party will lay its "cards" on the table. In the proposed model of
conflict management, a combination of both the rule and power
oriented approaches will still exist to some extent due to the
disparate economic strengths of the actors. Because, in the pro-
posed framework, all or most of the members of the WTO will be
RIAs, there will be a greater risk of muscle flexing during and
after negotiations exists. Accordingly, under the proposed model,
the ramifications of exiting the WTO will be much more serious.
and pay compensation to affected parties even if domestic political conditions influ-
enced the decision to violate the rule. Second, if critics of the legalistic system are
worried about correction of violations, they should realize that pressuring a violating
party will probably result in greater compliance. The violating country's government
may be able to ease domestic pressures by acknowledging the ramifications of con-
demnation and retaliation by the GATT. See HUDEC, supra note 58, at 35-37.
67. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade - Multilateral Trade Negotiations
(The Uruguay Round): Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing The Set-
tlement of Disputes, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 112 (1994) [hereinafter Understanding
of 1993] (discussed in depth infra part II.B).
68. See Michael K. Young, Dispute Resolution in the Uruguay Round: Lawyers
Triumph Over Diplomats, 29 INT'L LAw. 389, 405 (1995) ("[Tlhe Understanding deci-
sively moves the GATT dispute resolution process towards a unified, coherent adju-
dicatory system."). However, within the context of an inter-regional (NAFTA-EU) con-
flict management system, some members might support a less rule-oriented ap-
proach, perhaps on the grounds that negotiating a solution is easier when fewer
parties are involved, thus making an adjudicative system unnecessary. Part V of this
comment addresses why such an approach should be rejected.
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C. Dispute Resolution Mechanisms Prior to the Uruguay
Round
From the beginning, the question of what constitutes a
"GATT dispute" has been unclear.69 The GATT provides more
than thirty articles outlining various procedures used to resolve
different types of disputes. For example, activities ranging from
consultations to the "joint action power" of Article XXV:1 are
within the ambit of "dispute settlement."7 ° The Articles tradi-
tionally believed to govern the DRM are Articles XXII7' and XXIII.7"
69. See Montafti I Mora, supra note 27, at 115.
70. See JACKSON, supra note 31, at 164-166 (Jackson identifies nineteen clauses
that provide for obligatory consultation and seven provisions for compensatory with-
drawal or suspension of concessions.).
71. Article XXII reads as follows:
1. Each contracting party shall accord sympathetic consideration
to, and shall afford adequate opportunity for consultation re-
garding, such representations as may be made by another con-
tracting party with respect to any matter affecting the operation
of this Agreement.
2. The CONTRACTING PARTIES may, at the request of a contract-
ing party, consult with any contracting party or parties in re-
spect of any matter for which it has not been possible to find a
satisfactory solution through consultation under paragraph 1.
72. Article XXIII reads as follows:
1. If any contracting party should consider that any benefit ac-
cruing to it directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being
nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of
the Agreement is being impeded as the result of:
(a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its obli-
gations under this Agreement, or
(b) the application by another contracting party of any measure,
whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of this Agree-
ment, or
(c) the existence of any other situation, the contracting party
may, with a view to the satisfactory adjustment of the matter,
make written representations or proposals to the other contract-
ing party or parties which it considers to be concerned. Any con-
tracting party thus approached shall give sympathetic consider-
ation to the representations or proposals made to it.
2. If no satisfactory adjustment is effected between the contract-
ing parties concerned within a reasonable time, or if the difficul-
ty is of the type described in paragraph 1(c) of this Article, the
matter may be referred to the CONTRACTING PARTIES. The CON-
TRACTING PARTIES shall promptly investigate any matter so re-
ferred to them and shall make appropriate recommendations to
the contracting parties which they consider to be concerned, or
give a ruling on the matter, as appropriate. The CONTRACTING
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Article XXII contains a very broad clause that provides for
initial bilateral consultation and then multilateral consultation
if the former effort fails. The main dispute resolution procedure,
however, is developed based upon the provisions of Article
XXII." Under Article XXIII, it is possible to file both violation
and nonviolation complaints.74 The main difference between the
two is that a party can bring a violation complaint only .if the
defending party has actually breached GATT rules.75
1. Functioning of the Dispute Resolution Mechanism in the
1950s
Despite its uncertain beginnings, it is generally agreed that
the GATT resolved disputes among member states fairly effec-
tively during the 1950s.76 However, the effectiveness of the pro-
cedure during this time is difficult to evaluate since "there are
no data on how many complaints were compromised, or dropped,
or not even brought, because of anticipated difficulty in securing
compliance. "77
PARTIES may consult with contracting parties, with the Economic
and Social Council of the United Nations and with any appropri-
ate inter-governmental organization in cases where they consider
such consultation necessary. If the CONTRACTING PARTIES con-
sider that the circumstances are serious enough to justify such
action, they may authorize a contracting party or parties to sus-
pend the application to any other contracting party or parties of
such concessions or other obligations under this Agreement as
they determine to be appropriate in the circumstances. If the ap-
plication to any contracting party of any concession or other
obligation is in fact suspended, that contracting party shall then
be free, not later than sixty days after such action is taken, to
give written notice to the Executive Secretary to the CONTRACT-
ING PARTIES of its intention to withdraw from this Agreement
and such withdrawal shall take effect upon the sixtieth day fol-
lowing the day on which such notice is received by him.
73. See Montafi& I Mora, supra note 27, at 116.
74. Id. at 117.
75. Id. In practice, from 1948 to July 1991, only ten percent (10%) of com-
plaints formally raised under Article XXIII have been non-violation complaints. Id. at
117 n.57.
76. Between 1952 and 1958 forty complaints were filed. Eleven complaints were
pursued by the parties to a third party ruling. Thirty six of these forty cases had
an identifiable result. In thirty the complainant reported satisfaction. See Hudec,
supra note 63, at 151 n.10.
77. See HUDEC, supra note 24, at 95.
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Articles XXII and XXIII addressed the main steps in the
dispute settlement process only in the most general terms. Lack
of specific procedural directives forced the GATT to improvise.
Consequently, contracting parties created working groups to
make recommendations and reports. 8 These working groups
consisted of delegations from the parties to the dispute, other
interested parties, and other GATT parties. 9 These working
groups focused on negotiating a settlement before reporting to
the contracting parties.80
Later, panels composed of representatives of nations not
parties to the dispute investigated each disputed matter and
gave recommendations. The panel proceedings were informal,
and both the judges and the lawyers acted as diplomats rather
than lawyers."' Panel rulings "were drafted with an elusive dip-
lomatic vagueness ... [and] because of policy cohesion within
[the GATT] community, the rate of compliance with these vague
[decisions] was rather high."
82
2. The 1960s
The 1960s saw a sharp decline in the status of GATT law.
The GATT's membership increased dramatically, moving away
from the homogeneity of the previous decade. 2 The change in
the international trade environment, coupled with a change in
the GATT's policy agenda, created a higher level of conflict and
a lower level of effectiveness in dispute resolution.8
The GATT made two major changes during the decade: (1)
the European Community took over the seats of six original
European members and (2) the number of members from devel-
78. Id. at 84.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION
OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 12 (1993).
82. Id.
83. Id., citing to GATT BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND DOCUMENTS 99-100 (8th Supp.
1960); GATT BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND DOCUMENTS vii (17th Supp. 1970) ("[Tlhe
number of developing country members expanded more than three-fold, shifting the





oping countries tripled.8" As a result, member nations had more
difficulty reaching a consensus, something which the GATT had
always relied on to guide its operation.
Many of the original GATT rules were inadequate to ad-
dress the new international trade issues of the 1960s. Rules in
the areas of agriculture, import barriers, and most-favored-na-
tion practices lost widespread support in the GATT and were
often violated."
At the same time, led by the efforts of the EC and the U.S.,
the GATT nations began relying on what Hudec called an "anti-
legalist" approach to dispute resolution.87 The U.S. and the EC
condemned any legal action taken by other GATT members as
"legalistic" and viewed any legal claim brought under GATT as
an "unfriendly action." 8 By 1963 the adjudication system fell
into complete disuse. 9 "Consultation-style diplomacy ... [was]
glorified as the ideal of regulatory policy.
'90
3. The Tokyo Round and the Road to the Uruguay Round
Increasing concern for the credibility of the GATT and the
future of international trade relations inspired an effort to re-
build the GATT legal system. The Tokyo Round of multilateral
trade negotiations began in 1971. During these negotiations,
increasing concern for the credibility of the GATT and for the
future of international relations generally, made it clear that the
GATT legal system required renovation. The U.S. - unlike the
EC, which continued to support a more diplomatic approach"
- abandoned its anti-legalistic stance and focused on rebuilding
the system. This change on the part of the U.S. was due to do-
mestic pressures which created a need for the enforcement of
U.S. trade agreement rights.92
85. Id.
86. Hudec, supra note 63, at 160.
87. HUDEC, supra note 81, at 12.
88. Id. at 13.
89. Id.
90. Hudec, supra note 63, at 151.
91. See Julia C. Bliss, GATr Dispute Settlement Reform in the Uruguay Round:
Problems and Prospects, 23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 31, 39 (1987).
92. HUDEC, supra note 81, at 13.
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By the end of the Tokyo Round, the member states had
created for the first time a number of codes directed at the regu-
lation of non-tariff barriers to trade." They also revamped the
GATT's general dispute resolution procedure.94 The revised pro-
cedure was codified in the Understanding Regarding Notifica-
tion, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance." This
codification attempted to overcome the weaknesses in the system
illustrated by the DISC case.9" In that case, the European Com-
munity attacked U.S. tax legislation, known as DISC legisla-
tion," charging that the U.S. enacted export subsidies in vio-
lation of GATT Article XVI:4. The U.S. responded to this com-
plaint by filing three counter-complaints charging that if DISC
legislation violated GATT, then the income tax laws of France,
Belgium, and the Netherlands did also.9 It took three years to
reach an agreement concerning panel composition, as the dis-
pute seemed to reach an impasse at every step of the proce-
dure.'
00
The Understanding of 1979 provided that complaints and
93. The Kennedy Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (1963-67), however,
produced an anti-dumping code later codified as Article VI of the GATT. KENNETH
W. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 174-75
(1970).
94. HUDEC, supra note 81, at 13.
95. Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and
Surveillance, GATT Doc. L/4907 (Nov. 28, 1979) reprinted in GArT BASIC INSTRU-
MENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 210 (26th Supp. 1980) [hereinafter Understanding
of 1979].
96. DISC is an acronym for Domestic International Sales Corporation, the name
of the 1971 law granting special tax benefits to U.S. exporters. HUDEC, supra note
81, at 59. The original DISC law is Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178,
§§ 501-507, 85 Stat. 535-53 (1971), (codified as amended in 26 U.S.C. §§ 991-997
(1982)). The DISC legislation was an effort by Congress, using a tax deferral
scheme, to encourage exports by lowering income taxes on profits from corporations'
exports. Id. at 60; see also Robert E. Hudec, Reforming GATT Adjudication Proce-
dures: The Lessons of the DISC Case, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1443 (1988).
97. See supra note 96.
98. HUDEC, supra note 81, at 59. In international trade terms a "subsidy" un-
der Article XVI:4 is "any advantage that distorts the market behavior of the recipi-
ent in favor of the subsidized transaction." Id. at 62.
99. Id. at 59.
100. See John H. Jackson, The Jurisprudence of International Trade: The DISC
case in GATT, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 747, 760-64 (1978). For a more thorough discus-
sion of why the United States may have lost some of its enthusiasm for legalism by
the end of the Uruguay Round, see David Palmeter & Gregory J. Spak, Resolving
Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Disputes: Defining GATT's Role In an Era of
Increasing Conflict, 24 LAw & POL'Y INT'L BUS., 1145 (1993).
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counter-complaints that do not concern the same matter should
not be linked.1"' It also set guidelines as to the composition of
the parties and required that a panel issue a report which
should be adopted by the contracting parties within a reasonable
period of time.' 2 It failed, however, to provide for the enforce-
ment of the panel recommendations, giving the complaining
party little recourse if the defendant failed to voluntarily imple-
ment the recommendation.13 The Understanding of 1979 re-
vealed that the views of those favoring a diplomatic approach to
dispute resolution prevailed during this period.
After the Tokyo Round, use of the GATT legal system in-
creased."0 4 Many problems soon became evident, including de-
lays in the formation of panels because of disputes over panel
composition, the term of consultation periods, blockages of panel
reports, and non-compliance with recommendations." 5
In the 1980s, a massive U.S. trade deficit and a general
feeling that GATT law was not adequately protecting U.S. inter-
ests prompted many U.S. political leaders to advocate a policy of
"unilateralism.""6 They argued that the trade imbalance justi-
fied the U.S. in "taking the law into its own hands."'0 7 The
U.S. began to confront governments which it believed were
maintaining illegal or unreasonable restrictions, demanding
elimination of these restrictions by threatening unilateral trade
retaliation."8
Meanwhile, in September 1986 the parties to the GATT
launched a new round of multilateral trade negotiations in
Punta del Este, Uruguay. 9 The need for improved and
strengthened dispute resolution procedures was one of the main
issues addressed in the Uruguay Round Ministerial Declara-
tion."
101. Understanding of 1979, supra note 95, at 211-12.
102. Id. at 212-14.
103. The Understanding of 1979 asked only that the contracting parties find an
appropriate solution, which could lead to retaliation. Id. at 214.
104. HUDEC, supra note 81, at 13.




109. See Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, (Sept. 20, 1986) reprint-
ed in GATT BAsic INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 19 (33d Supp. 1987).
110. Id. at 25.
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The U.S. Congress expressed its dissatisfaction with the
functioning of the GATT DRM by introducing Section 301 of the
Trade Act of 1974, which authorized the president to respond to
unfair foreign trade practices."' Because unilateralism worked
so well in removing trade barriers, by 1990 many argued that it
should become the new U.S. policy with regard to dispute resolu-
tion."' Many observers wondered whether the ambitious re-
form goals set for the Uruguay Round were "out of touch with
the realities of governmental legal behavior.""' The events of
1994, however, put to rest most doubts about the viability of the
Uruguay Round.
III. AFTER THE URUGUAY ROUND: THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE
LEGAL SYSTEM UNDER THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
A. Introduction
The Final Act of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations"" (Final Act) was signed by representatives of
more than 100 governments in Marrakesh, Morocco on April 15,
1994."5 At that time the long awaited World Trade Organiza-
tion was formed by way of an agreement annexed to the Final
Act."' The WTO actually went into effect on January 1,
1995.17
The WTO, which replaced the GATT as an institutional
body, was created to facilitate the resolution of disputes among
parties and, generally, to enforce rules."8 The GATT 1994, in-
111. See Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2416 (1988).
112. HUDEC, supra note 81, at 15.
113. Id.
114. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade - Multilateral Trade Negotiations
(the Uruguay Round): Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Trade Negotiations, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 1 (1994) [hereinafter Final Act].
115. Karel van Wolferen, Will the New World Trade Organization Work? No
Chance - East and West Trade Won't Meet, WASH. POST, June 26, 1994, at C3.
116. The Agreement Establishing the Multilateral Trade Organization [World
Trade Organization], Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 13 (1994) [hereinafter World Trade
Organization Agreement].
117. Id.
118. Julius L. Katz, GATT Is Threatened by the Squeamish . . . , WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 30, 1994, at A10. "A key difference between the GATT and the WTO is that
the WTO Agreement is a 'single undertaking,' integrating many Uruguay Round and
previous GATT agreements into a single legal framework." Judith H. Bello & Mary
1995]
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cluded under the Agreements on Trade in Goods, 19 replaced
the 1947 provisional GATT. The Final Act of the Uruguay
Round also included unprecedented agreements on Trade in
Services 2 ° and on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights, including Trade in Counterfeit Goods.' These
agreements on trade in services and intellectual property were
breakthroughs that responded to the criticism that the GATT
failed to deal with these crucial areas. Another breakthrough for
the WTO is found in the new dispute resolution policy.
B. The 1993 Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes
With the WTO came a restructured DRM, the Understand-
ing on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dis-
putes, 22 which sought to deal with the ineffectiveness of the
previous GATT DRM. The new DRM has several major features.
First, the Understanding of 1993 established an "integrated"
dispute resolution system 2 in response to complaints about
E. Footer, Symposium: Uruguay Round-GATTIWTO: Preface, 29 INT'L LAW. 335, 340
(1995). The Ministerial Conference, composed of representatives of all member coun-
tries, is the principal organ of the WTO and is required to meet at least once every
two years. Id. at 341. During the interim periods between such conferences, the
General Council (the GATT Council successor) is the governing body. Id. The Gener-
al Council is composed of representatives of all member countries and is assisted by
three sub-councils: the Council for Trade in Goods, Council for Trade in Services,
and the Council for Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. Id.
119. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade - Multilateral Trade Negotiations
(the Uruguay Round): Agreements on Trade in Goods, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 28
(1994).
120. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade - Multilateral Trade Negotiations
(the Uruguay Round): General Agreement on Trade in Services, Dec. 15, 1993, 33
I.L.M. 44 (1994).
121. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade - Multilateral Trade Negotiations
(the Uruguay Round): Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994).
122. See Understanding of 1993, supra note 67, at 112.
123. See Montafn I Mora, supra note 27, at 142. The Understanding of 1993
will apply to the GATT 1994, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS),
and the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, includ-
ing Trade in Counterfeit Goods (TRIPs). However, the system is still somewhat di-
versified in that the Understanding of 1993 will not necessarily apply to disputes
regarding the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft, Government Procurement, Inter-
national Dairy Agreement, and the Arrangement Regarding Bovine Meat. See Under-
standing of 1993, Appendix 1: Agreements Covered By The Understanding, 33 I.L.M.
131 (1994).
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the diversification of procedures embodied in the various individ-
ual agreements entered into after the Tokyo Round. 24
Second is the creation of a Dispute Settlement Body (DSB)
which will take over certain administrative functions of the
DRM, such as the establishment of panels or the adoption of
panel reports.'25 Membership in the DSB will be available to
all WTO members.'26
Third, in contrast with the GATT DRM before the Uruguay
Round, where a diplomatic, anti-legalist approach prevailed, the
Understanding of 1993 has apparently moved toward a rule-
based approach. 2 ' This is evidenced by the creation of a
Standing Appellate Body (SAB) whose members must be persons
of "recognized authority, with demonstrated expertise in
law.""' While the parties have avoided the use of the term tri-
bunal, "the Appellate Body has all of the characteristics of an in-
ternational tribunal"2 " in that it adjudicates disputes rather
than simply facilitating negotiations."0 The members are to be
unaffiliated with any government and broadly representative of
WTO membership."' If a panel has issued a report with which
a party to the dispute disagrees, the party may appeal to the
SAB by formally notifying the DSB of its intention to do so.'
Fourth, the Understanding of 1993 modified the traditional
consensus rule, which is of great importance for the establish-
ment of panels and the adoption of panel reports. In contrast to
the GATT DRM prior to the Uruguay Round, panels are estab-
lished and reports are considered adopted unless there is con-
sensus to decide against the establishment of a panel"3 or a
124. See, e.g., Can GATT Resolve International Trade Disputes?, 77 AM. SoC'Y
INT'L L. PRoc. 287, 288 (1983).
125. See Understanding of 1993, supra note 67, at 114, § 2.1.
126. See Young, supra note 68, at 399. Thus, all member countries of the WTO
will probably also become members of the DSB.
127. See id. at 405.
128. See Understanding of 1993, supra note 67, at 123, § 17.3.
129. Montafik I Mora, supra note 27, at 144.
130. The Body will be composed of seven members, serving in rotation, with
three "judges" sitting on each case. See Understanding of 1993, supra note 67, at
123, § 17.1.
131. Id. § 17.3.
132. Id. § 16.4.
133. Understanding of 1993, supra note 67, § 6.1, provides: "If the complaining
party so requests . .. a panel shall be established unless at that meeting, the DSB
decides by consensus not to establish the panel."
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decision not to adopt a panel report.14 The same rule applies
for the adoption of Appellate Body Reports135 and the rejection
of requests for the suspension of concessions.13 6 These changes
are very important for the conceptualization of the WTO DRM in
that they mark a turning point in favor of a judicial mechanism.
Now the Dispute Settlement Body only interferes in very sensi-
tive cases where a strict application of the judicial procedure
would lead to undesirable results.
A fifth notable feature of the new rules is that they seem to
dictate the exclusivity of the Understanding of 1992 as a source
of procedure for the resolution of GATT disputes.3 7 In a sec-
tion of the Understanding of 1993 titled "Strengthening of the
Multilateral System," the GATT members indicated the impor-
tance of preventing unilateral measures by one member state
against another.3 8 The Understanding of 1993 makes clear
that all disputes arising in connection with the covered agree-
ments3 ' shall be settled only "through recourse to dispute set-
tlement in accordance with the rules and procedures of this
Understanding."4 ' Finally, certain important changes have
been made in certain phases of the dispute resolution proce-
dures.'
134. Understanding of 1993, supra note 67, § 16.4, provides: "Within sixty days
of the issuance of a panel report to the Members, the report shall be adopted at a
DSB meeting unless one of the parties to the dispute formally notifies the DSB of
its decision to appeal or the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report."
(footnote omitted).
135. id. § 17.14.
136. Id. § 22.6.
137. See Montafib I Mora, supra note 27, at 143 n.179. Montafib I Mora notes
that under the old GAT system, parties to a dispute used the GATT DRM simply
because it was customary to do so. Theoretically, parties could have resorted to
other customary methods of international dispute resolution such as the Internation-
al Court of Justice or conventional arbitration. According to the new system:
when contracting parties seek the redress of a violation of obli-
gations or other nullification or impairment of benefits under the
GATT or an impediment to the attainment of any objectives of the
GATT, they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and
procedures of this Understanding.
Id. See also Understanding of 1993, supra note 67, at 128, § 23.
138. Understanding of 1993, supra note 67, at 128, § 23.
139. For a list of agreements covered by the Understanding, see Understanding
of 1993, Appendix I: Agreements Covered By the Understanding, 33 I.L.M. 131.
140. Understanding of 1993, supra note 67, at 129, § 23.2(a).
141. The least significant changes have been made in pre-panel formation proce-
dures, and consequently the least amount of attention will be dedicated to it in the
discussion. The most substantial changes have been made in the panel process as
1995] DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEMS 585
1. Pre-Panel Stage
Prior to requesting the establishment of a panel, the Under-
standing of 1993 provides that parties to a dispute must engage
in consultations "in good faith within a period of no more than
thirty days."H2 If the defending party does not respond to the
complaining party's request for consultation, the complaining
party may request the establishment of a panel." The only
changes implemented by the Understanding of 1993 are the
establishment of shorter deadlines in urgent cases'" and the
regulation of third party intervention (a member other than the
consulting member)." Good offices, conciliation, and medi-
ation, are voluntary and are undertaken only if the parties so
agree.' The Understanding of 1993 made no significant revi-
sions to the GATT DRM with respect to those procedures. 4
well as in post-panel procedures, which will be the focus of the discussion.
142. Understanding of 1993, supra note 67, at 116, § 4.3. This time-controlled
consultation process is similar to the 1989 Improvements, which were an agreement
on textual revisions to the GATT DRM reached during the mid-term review of the
Uruguay Round Negotiations in Montreal on April 12, 1989. See Conciliation of Im-
provements to GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures, Apr. 12, 1989, re-
printed in GATT BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 61 (36th Supp.
1990). The advantage of this process is that the dispute should not get bogged down
in the consultation phase.
143. Understanding of 1993, supra note 67, at 116, § 4.3.
144. Id. at 117, §§ 4.8, 4.9. The Understanding of 1993 cites only one example
of an urgent case: those concerning perishable goods. Id. § 4.9. The factors which
would make a case urgent are probably similar to the necessary criteria for obtain-
ing an injunction or temporary restraining order in the United States Court system:
the risk of irreparable harm or injury if an injunction is not granted to the moving
party, inter alia. See, e.g., Joseph T. McLaughlin & Kevin Rampe, Preliminary In-
junctive Relief in the Federal Courts, in CURRENT PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL CIVIL PRAC-
TICE 1994, at 473 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 498,
1994); 43A C.J.S. INJUNCTIONS §§ 41-342 (1978 & Supp. 1995); see also Corrigan
Dispatch Co. v. Casa Guzman, S.A., 569 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1978) (discussing prelimi-
nary injunction issues in cases of perishable commodities).
145. Id. at 117, § 4.11.
146. Id. at 117, § 5.1. Good offices, conciliation or mediation in the GATT are
intended to allow the parties to a dispute to negotiate their differences before a
neutral third party, and these procedures actually come closer to a "so-called media-
tion." See Norio Komuru, The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism - Coverage and
Procedures of the WTO Understanding, 29 J. WORLD TRADE, Aug. 1995, at 5, 47
n.148. This differs from the panel process in that the mediator or conciliator does
not have the power to impose a ruling as a panel does. Id.
147. See Palitha T.B. Kohona, Dispute Resolution Under the World Trade Organi-
zation: An Overview, J. WORLD TRADE, April 1994, at 23, 34 (discussing The Draft
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes). The
provisions regarding these procedures, although a bit more detailed, are very similar
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2. Panel Stage
A fundamental procedural reform introduced by the Under-
standing of 1993 was the express right of the parties to a pan-
el." Recognition of this explicit right was important for two
reasons. First, it supported the trend toward a legalistic ap-
proach to dispute resolution. Second, it curtailed either an ob-
structing party or an interested government's ability to delay
panel formation. 4" In urgent cases, the complaining party may
request that the Dispute Settlement Body convene within fifteen
days of the original request to establish a panel.50 Moreover, a
panel will almost always be formed when sought because con-
sensus is now required to oppose establishment of a panel.
A second area of reform at the panel stage involves the
panel's composition. The Understanding of 1993 provides that a
panel will typically be composed of three members'' who may
be either governmental or non-governmental individuals.' 2
The panelists shall be:
persons who either have served on or presented a case to a
panel, served as a representative of a [WTO] Member .... or
as a representative to a council or committee of any covered
agreement or its predecessor agreement; or in the Secretari-
at, taught or published on international trade law or policy,
or served as a senior trade policy official of a Member."
The panelist requirements are intended to enhance both the
"quality and the authority of panel reports."'"
The Understanding of 1993 further seeks to guarantee the
impartiality of the panel and its panelists; it states that panel-
to the Improvements of 1989.
148. Understanding of 1993, supra note 67, at 118, § 6.1. This provision follows
paragraph F(a) of the 1989 Conciliation of Improvements to GATT Dispute Settle-
ment Rules and Procedures, Apr. 12, 1989, reprinted in GATT BASIC INSTRUMENTS
AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 61 (36th Supp. 1990).
149. See generally Rosine Plank, An Unofficial Description of How a GATT Panel
Works and Does Not, 4 J. INT'L ARB. 53, 63 (1987).
150. Understanding of 1993, supra note 67, at 118 n.5, § 6.1.
151. Id. § 8.5.
152. Id. § 8.1.
153. Id.
154. See Montaft I Mora, supra note 27, at 148.
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ists "should be selected with a view to ensuring the indepen-
dence of the members, a sufficiently diverse background and a
wide spectrum of experience."'55 In addition, a panelist cannot
be a citizen of a Member who is a party to the dispute, unless
the parties reach a contrary agreement.'56
In addition, the Understanding of 1993 sought to remedy
one of the traditional problems faced by the GATT DRM - the
lack of suitable individuals to serve as panelists. As a result, it
mandates the creation of a "superpanel."'57 The superpanel is a
list of qualified governmental and non-governmental individuals
from which panelists may be drawn as necessary.58
The Understanding of 1993 also makes some important
innovations in panel procedure. First, it provides for almost
automatic adoption of panel reports. 59 If one of the parties to
the dispute chooses not to appeal, the DSB will adopt the report
unless it reaches a consensus agreement not to."6 The shift
away from adoption by consensus demonstrates the movement
towards a judicial approach to dispute resolution.
The second innovation is the creation of the Standing Appel-
late Body (SAB).'5 ' Any party to a dispute may appeal a panel
decision to the SAB within sixty days of the decision's issu-
ance."6 2 The appeal "shall be limited to issues of law covered in
the panel report and legal interpretation developed by the pan-
el."6 3 Because the SAB may either uphold, modify, or reverse
the legal findings and conclusions of the panel,"u the DSB will
not consider the adoption of a panel report until the appellate
155. Understanding of 1993, supra note 67, at 118, § 8.2.
156. Id. § 8.3.
157. This phrase was coined by Professor William Davey. In suggesting the
creation of a "superpanel," he argued that this type of selectivity would heighten the
panel's status and result in greater respect for its decisions. He concluded that "be-
cause the group would stand ready to hear all cases, the problem of staffing panels
would disappear." William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in the GATT, 11 FORDHAM
IN'L L.J. 51, 104 (1987).
158. Understanding of 1993, supra note 67, at 119, § 8.4.
159. Id. § 16.4.
160. Id.
161. Id. § 17.1.
162. Id. § 16.4. This provision was strongly supported by the U.S. as well as
some other negotiating parties. See Kohona, supra note 147, at 39.
163. Understanding of 1993, supra note 67, at 123, § 17.6. This provision of the
Understanding of 1993 illustrates the influence of the common law legal system.
164. Id. § 17.13.
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phase is completed. 65 Any individual opinions within the
SAB's report must be anonymous'66 and may only address the
legal issues raised on the appeal.'67 The DSB will adopt the
appellate report unless, within thirty days of the report's issu-
ance, the DSB decides not to by consensus. 6 '
The creation of the SAB is generally a good development
because it marks a dramatic shift toward legalism. There are,
however, quite a few problems that may interfere with its oper-
ation within the context of the WTO. First, it may be difficult for
more than one hundred parties to agree on the composition of a
permanent appellate tribunal. Second, there are no defined lim-
its on the subject matter of an appeal. As a result, each "losing"
party could appeal any panel decision and overload the SAB.
Finally, panels will be forced to move away from their tradition-
al pragmatic approach to dispute resolution because of the Un-
derstanding of 1993's failure to define the limits of appellate
review.69 Panelists will now have to draft their decisions in
strict accordance with WTO law, because they may be subject to
appellate review. This transition, while difficult at first, is a
positive long run innovation.
3. Post-Panel Stage
The majority of GATT dispute resolution problems have
been related to either non-compliance or non-implementation of
GATT Council 70 rulings. The Understanding of 1993 includes
regulations which are intended to ensure compliance with DSB
decisions. The most important aspects of the new regulations are
examined below.
165. Id. § 16.4.
166. Id. § 17.11.
167. Id. § 17.12.
168. Id. § 17.14.
169. Panels have on several occasions disregarded the rules of interpretation out-
lined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. This use of an ad hoc ap-
proach prevents the emergence of any sort of coherent jurisprudence. See Edmond
McGovern, Dispute Settlement in the GATT - Adjudication or Negotiation, in THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNrrY AND GATT, supra note 57, at 73, 79. GATT panels have
often cited earlier panel reports in support of a particular rule interpretation. How-
ever, there is no concept of binding precedent in GATT-panel decision making. Id.
170. The Council was the predecessor of what is now referred to as the Dispute
Settlement Body (DSB) by the Understanding of 1993. Young, supra note 68, at 399.
588 [Vol. 26:3
1995] DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEMS
First, the Understanding of 1993 establishes a deadline for
the implementation of a panel ruling or recommendation. Within
thirty days of DSB's adoption of either a panel or Appellate
Body Report, "the Member concerned shall inform the DSB of its
intentions in respect of implementation of the recommendations
and rulings of the DSB and [if immediate compliance is imprac-
ticable] the Member concerned shall have a reasonable period of
time in which to do so. ""' Because the phrase "reasonable pe-
riod of time" is inherently vague, the Understanding of 1993 re-
quires the period to be be fixed beforehand." 2
The Understanding of 1993 also attempts to address the
recent problems related to the inadequate measures adopted by
members while attempting to comply with panel recommenda-
tions or rulings. 7' It provides that if "there is disagreement as
to the existence or consistency with a covered agreement of mea-
sures taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings" a
new dispute resolution procedure will be initiated utilizing the
original panel whenever possible. 4  The Understanding of
1993 contains several enforcement provisions.
171. Understanding of 1993, supra note 67, at 125, § 21.3.
172. Id. The prior 1979 Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dis-
pute Settlement and Surveillance, reprinted in GATT' BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SE-
LECTED DOCUMENTS 210, 1 22 (26th Supp. 1980), merely provided that if recommen-
dations were "not implemented within a reasonable period of time, the contracting
party bringing the case may ask the Contracting Parties to make suitable efforts
with a view to finding an appropriate solution." This provision also failed to define a
reasonable period of time and did not indicate what measures the Council could take
to ensure compliance with its decisions.
173. For example, in 1989 a GATT panel declared that EU subsidies to the oil-
seed sector were incompatible with the GATT because "benefits accruing to the Unit-
ed States under Article II of the General Agreement were impaired as a result of
[EU] production subsidy schemes." James R. Arnold, Note, The Oilseeds Dispute and
the Validity of Unilateralism in a Multilateral Context, 30 STAN. J. INT'L L. 187, 190
(1994). The U.S., prompted by what it perceived to be a lack of effective implemen-
tation by the EU, requested a reconvening of the panel which condemned the EU
policy again in 1992. See 9 INT'L TRADE REP. 533 (BNA) (Mar. 25, 1992).
As a result of the EU's continued failure to remedy the violation, the United
States government took the law into its own hands and threatened to impose duties
of up to 200% on European goods imported into the U.S. Arnold, supra, at 188. In
November of 1992, the EU and the U.S. hovered on the brink of a trade war, but a
team of negotiators managed to avoid the disaster. Id. at 187-88. After witnessing
the potentially disastrous effects of unilateral retaliation, as seen in this dispute,
GATT parties entering the Uruguay Round were no longer questioning whether a
GATT judiciary was wise, but rather concerned themselves with "how much
judicialization it will take to end the threat of unilateral retaliation." Id. at 220.
174. Understanding of 1993, supra note 67, at 126, § 21.5.
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One of the most significant provisions regulates compensa-
tion and suspension of concessions. This provision states that
"compensation and the suspension of concessions or other obliga-
tions are temporary measures available in the event that the
recommendations and rulings are not implemented within a
reasonable period of time."'75 This wording clearly suggests
that specific performance is preferred in the long run to any
other alternative. If, however, a defending party fails to imple-
ment a panel ruling within a reasonable period of time, a com-
plaining party may request negotiations.'78 The defending
party is compelled to participate in any negotiation.177 If the
parties do not reach an agreement on compensation within
twenty days, the complaining party may then seek authorization
from the DSB to suspend concessions or any other obligations
under the covered agreements.'78 The DSB will suspend con-
cessions unless it decides, by consensus, to reject the re-
quest.'79 If a dispute arises between the parties as to the fair-
ness of the retaliation, it may be referred to arbitrationse if ei-
ther: 1) the losing party objects to the level of proposed suspen-
sion; or 2) the party claims that the principles and procedures
175. Id. § 22.1.
176. Id. § 22.2.
177. Id.
178. Id. Although this possibility has hardly been invoked in GATT practice, it
is likely that parties will use it more frequently in the future because the modified
consensus rule applies here as well. If a complaining party decides to request the
suspension of concessions or other obligations, the Understanding of 1993 sets out
detailed principles and procedures that the party must follow in doing so. Id. § 22.3.
In general, "the level of the suspension of concessions or other obligations authorized
by the DSB shall be equivalent to the level of nullification and impairment." Id. §
22.4. If the defaulting party disagrees with the level of suspension proposed or
claims that the set guidelines have not been followed, the matter shall be referred
to binding arbitration - carried out by the original panel if possible. Id. § 22.6.
179. Id. While the provisions discussed seem like a step in the right direction
because they address a previously unregulated area of the DRM, certain issues re-
garding their utilization remain. First, it is unclear whether retaliatory measures
will induce a violating party to comply with a panel decision. In contrast to the
intent of the Understanding of 1993, such measures could evolve into a permanent
substitute for specific performance. Second, the deterrent effect of sanctions are
doubtful. See JACKSON, supra note 15, at 76. Moreover, economic theory dictates that
'trade restrictions are, first and foremost, detrimental to the country which introduc-
es them." See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, International and European Foreign Trade
Law: GATT Dispute Settlement Proceedings Against The EEC, 22 COMMON MKr. L.
REV. 441, 473 (1985).
180. This should not be confused with the provisions on arbitration, as an alter-
native to the procedures of the Understanding, discussed infra part III.B.4.
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set forth in Understanding have not been followed where a com-
plaining party has requested authorization to take cross-retalia-
tion.181 The arbitration should be completed within sixty days
and does not suspend concessions or other obligations during
that time.182
4. Arbitration
The Understanding of 1993 allows the disputing parties to
participate in arbitration as an alternative to the formal pro-
ceedings outlined above, but only if the parties can clearly delin-
eate the disputed issues."3 The Understanding of 1993 estab-
lishes that arbitration awards are implemented under the same
provisions as panel proceedings.' Prior to the enactment of
the Understanding of 1993, arbitration may have been a better
alternative to traditional DRM procedures. Under the consensus
rule, however, arbitration has lost its key advantage vis-a-vis
the DRM because a defending party can no longer block any
rulings of either arbitral panels or a traditional DRM panel.
C. Preventative Medicine: The Trade Policy Review
Mechanism and Its Criticisms
The Ministerial Declaration of Punta Del Este empowered
the Negotiating Group on the Functioning of the GATT system
(FOG Negotiating Group) to "develop understandings and ar-
rangements.., to enhance the surveillance in the GATT to
enable regular monitoring of trade policies and practices of con-
tracting parties and their impact on the multilateral trading
system."
85
181. Understanding of 1993, supra note 67, at 128, § 22.6.
182. Id. The arbitrator acting under paragraph 22.6:
shall not examine the nature of the concessions or other obliga-
tions to be suspended but shall determine whether the level of
such suspension is equivalent to the level of nullification or
impairment. The arbitrator may also determine if the proposed
suspension of concessioins or other obligations is allowed under
the covered agreement.
Id. at 128, § 22.7.
183. Understanding of 1993, supra note 67, at 129, § 25.1.
184. Id. § 25.4.
185. See Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, supra note 24, 109, § E,
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The FOG Negotiating Group proposed a trade policy review
mechanism (TPRM) as a method of surveilling trade policies and
practices. 8" The TPRM would not be used to create new obli-
gations or enforce existing ones, but rather to provide the "high-
est level of clarity and candor on the part of the contracting
party under review" - known as "transparency." 7
In April of 1989, the GATT Council endorsed the FOG Nego-
tiating Group's TPRM agreement. The key standard for assess-
ment under the TPRM became the "impact a contracting party's
trade policies and practices make on the 'multilateral trading
order."" The GATT Council specifically disallowed the TPRM
from serving as a basis for the enforcement of GATT obligations,
or the creation of new policy obligations, or for dispute settle-
ment procedures." 9 The agreement requires every member
country to submit a full report outlining its trade policies and
practices when it is under review, based on an agreed format
called the Outline Country Format for Country Reports.9 ' A
full report was to be submitted by all parties within four years
of the implementation of the TPRM. The Uruguay Round Final
at 147, 148.
186. Id. at 148.
187. Id. at 147-148.
188. Id. at 149.
189. Id.
190. Outline Country Format for Country Report, reprinted in GATT BASIC IN-
STRUMENTS AND SELECTED DocuMENTS 406 (36th Supp. 1989). Members are asked to
provide information on the following:
1. Trade policy objectives.
2. How its import and export system relate to the objectives in 1
above.
3. The domestic laws and regulations governing the application of
trade policies.
4. The process of trade policy formation and review.
5. Relevant international agreements.
6. Trade policy measures used, e.g. tariffs, tariff quotas and sur-
charges, quantitative restrictions, non-tariff measures, customs
valuation, rules of origin, government procurement, technical
barriers, safeguard action, anti-dumping actions, countervailing
actions, export taxes and subsidies, free trade zones, export re-
strictions, State trading enterprises, foreign exchange controls
related to import/export, and any other measures covered by the
GATT, its annexes and protocols.
7. Programs in existence for trade liberalization.
8. Prospective changes in trade policy and practice to the extent




Act established a Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB) to adminis-
ter the TPRM, which is accorded permanent status.191 The
TPRB reports to the WTO Ministerial Conference, composed of
representatives of all the members, and is responsible for imple-
menting the TPRM and for making annual reports on develop-
ments in the international trading system.'92
The TPRB also serves as the repository of all required noti-
fications. 93 By the Year 2000 - five years after the WTO en-
tered into force - the TPRB must make an appraisal of the
TPRM's operations.' While the Uruguay Round did extend
the TPRM indefinitely and solidified its existing terms of refer-
ence and reporting requirements, it made few, if any, improve-
ments on the Interim TPRM established in 1989.195
1. Reasons For Current Ineffectiveness
The TPRM is meant to influence state "behavior" ex ante.
Some scholars refer to it as a "conditioning mechanism, "196 and
one author has analogized it to a psychoanalytical framework.
He compares the GATT to the psychoanalyst and the contracting
party being reviewed to the patient. The Outline Country For-
mat represents both the couch and the series of revealing ques-
tions which the patient must answer.'97 He argues that the
process of describing the objectives of trade policy, the process of
policy formulation, etc., within the framework of the TPRM, "is
not a mere contribution to transparency but rather its proffering
has the added consequence of having the potential to engender a
degree of sensitivity on the part of the contracting party to the
GATT trade ethos." "
This analysis depicts perhaps the greatest problem with the
191. Final Act, supra note 114, at 5; see also World Trade Organization Agree-
ment, supra note 116, at 16; Peter L.H. Van den Bossch, supra note 8, at 421.
192. Trade Policy Review Mechanism, Annex 3 (Uruguay Round Final Act), in
LAW & PRACTICE OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, Booklet 3, at 1-3 (Joseph F.
Dennin ed., 1995).
193. Id. at 2.
194. Id. at 3.
195. SCHOTT, supra note 8, at 143.
196. Qureshi, supra note 185, at 152.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 153.
1995]
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
TPRM because it takes a non-rule-based approach to evaluation;
even if it identifies a clear violation within a party's trade poli-
cies, it is powerless to make the party under review take any
corrective action.'99 Psychological pressure cannot be a substi-
tute for a mechanism which would dictate that the contracting
party under review must correct any serious problems identified
during the review process. Currently, if the party's policies are
inconsistent with its desired goals, and the policies are problem-
atic for other parties, the only likely result will be increased
"peer pressure" on the party to revise its policy."'
The stated objective of the TPRM - to obtain policy trans-
parency - undermines the mechanism within the GATT that
seeks to achieve greater compliance with GATT rules. Due to
the great number of GATT parties, and consequently to the
WTO, the TPRM reviews a party every two years at best.
20 '
This is not sufficient to achieve full transparency because of the
extent of economic change that may occur in a country's trade
policy within two years. While contracting parties must provide
brief reports when "significant changes" occur in their trade
policies,0 2 a party which so desires may be able to avoid filing
a report on the basis of alleged lack of importance of a political
change.
In addition, the criteria for determining how often a particu-
lar party should be subject to review is inadequate. It is depen-
dent on the impact the trade of the party has on the multilateral
trading system. The party's impact is determined by its share of
world trade in a particular period of time, not taking into ac-
count potential share of trade.0 3
As Blackhurst argues, however, a party might need to be
examined more frequently, specifically because it has a low
share of world trade and might be very protectionist. 20" He also
noted that the trade share criterion fails to consider the share of
199. See R. Blackhurst, Strengthening GATT Surveillance of Trade Related Poli-
cies, in THE NEW GATT ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 123, 147 (Ernst-Llrich Petersmann & M. Hilf eds., 1988).
200. Qureshi, supra note 185, at 147.
201. Id. at 151.
202. Id. at 150.
203. Id. at 151.
204. Blackhurst, supra note 199, at 151.
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trade in domestic output."0 5 The above criticisms suggest that
the TPRM, as it stands now within the GATT framework, is
unworkable.0 6 Although the legal system under the WTO has
evolved dramatically since the early days of the GATT, some
things have remained fundamentally unchanged. While the
Uruguay Round discussions acknowledged the significant growth
of RIAs in both number and importance,2 0 the parties failed to
address the implication of growing global regional integration for
the WTO's legal system.
IV. ADMISSIBILITY OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION AGREEMENTS
UNDER THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
A. Introduction
A significant proportion of world trade currently takes place
within regional integration agreements such as the EU and
NAFTA."' New or expanded agreements are continuously be-
ing negotiated. Scholars agree, however, that the GATT rules of
regional integration are inadequate."°
205. Id.
206. Professor Schott has assessed the mechanism as follows
In essence the TPRM reviews are seminars on national trade poli-
cies, with discussions based on two papers: a full report presented
by the country under review, and an independent analysis by the
WTO Secretariat based on information provided by the country
concerned and on other data available to the TPRM staff. To-
gether the two reports provide a useful trade policy retrospec-
tive but offer few comments or criticisms regarding the prospec-
tive evolution of those policies . . .In other words, the TPRB
debate remains an academic exercise, with little impact on the
domestic trade policy debate of member countries.
SCHOTT, supra note 8, at 141-142.
207. See Understanding On The Interpretation of Article XXIV of The General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, December 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 28, 34 [herein-
after Understanding on Article XXIV]. The Understanding on Article XXIV recog-
nized that "[C]ustoms unions and free trade areas have greatly increased in number
and importance since the establishment of the GATT in 1947 and today cover a
significant proportion of world trade." Id.
208. Id.
209. See Robert E. Baldwin, Adapting the GATT to a More Regionalized World:
A Political Economy Perspective, in REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND THE GLOBAL TRAD-
ING SYSTEM, supra note 10, at 395-96; Richard Blackhurst and David Henderson, Re-
gional Integration Agreements, World Integration and the GATT, in REGIONAL INTE-
GRATION AND THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 10, at 408.
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The original GATT contracting parties acknowledged the
future possibility of the emergence of RIAs and included Article
XXIV.2"' Article XXIV attempts to regulate RIA admissibility
under the GATT. As early as 1950, economist Jacob Viner ad-
dressed the question: "[S]hould regional integration be regarded
as a step toward global free trade?"" Professor McMillan ar-
gued that "RIM are unambiguously a good thing."12 In his ar-
gument, he refers to the Kemp-Vanek theory of customs unions
stating that "[i]t is always possible for a regional integration
agreement, formed among an arbitrary group of countries, to
structure itself in such a way as to make the member countries
better off without making any of the non-member countries
worse off."" 3 However, a less optimistic variation of the Kemp-
Vanek theorem concludes that it is also quite possible for RIAs
to structure themselves in such a way as to only benefit the
member countries, to the detriment of the non-member coun-
tries. Non-member countries may also suffer if special interest
groups from the member countries are able to persuade their
governments to tighten external trade restrictions. This has
already happened within the EU's agricultural sector.2"4
Former GATT Director General Arthur Dunkel stated that
GATT's rules are "designed to ensure above all that regional
210. GATT 1947, supra note 8, at 35.
211. See JACOB VINER, THE CUSTOMS UNION ISSUE (1950), discussed in
McMillan, supra note 10, at 293. Viner's answer was inconclusive. He posited that:
A RIA represents freer trade to the extent that it results in
trade creation: the shifting of the production of some goods from
a less efficient member country to a more efficient member coun-
try. A RIA represents more restricted trade to the extent that it
results in trade diversion: the shifting of production from an
efficient non-member country to a less efficient member country.
Id. Viner concluded that the question of whether trade creation outweighs trade
diversion is purely an empirical one. Id.
212. McMillan, supra note 10, at 293. McMillan's scholarship in the area of
international economic law has influenced the work of other authors. Schott and
Hufbauer adapted McMillan's suggestions for revised admissability criteria for RIAs
under Article XXIV, in proposing their own theory on GATT surveillance of RIA
trade diversion. HUFBAUER & SCHOTT, supra note 9, at 166.
213. McMillan, supra note 10, at 293.
214. Between 1960 and 1985, nearly one-third (33 out of 78) of all GATT com-
plaints were brought against the EU (then the EC) regarding agricultural trade
barriers. Robert E. Hudec, Legal Issues in US.-EC Trade Policy: GATT Litigation




integration should not be at the expense of third parties.""'5
McMillan suggests that if a RIA can be evaluated concerning
whether or not it causes harm to non-participating countries,
then the best test is whether it is admissible under the Kemp-
Vanek analysis: common external tariffs should not cause the
total volume of external trade to be lower than before the forma-
tion of the RIA.215 This standard of admissibility is quite differ-
ent from that provided by Article XXIV.
B. Article XXV and its Criticisms
GATT Article XXIV covers regional integration agree-
ments. 17 This Article is widely criticized as being imprecise
and not sufficiently strict.21 A former Deputy Director General
of GATT, speaking on Article XXIV said:
[Of] all the GATT articles, this is one of the most abused, and
those abuses are among the least noted. Unfortunately,
therefore, those framing any new [free trade area] need have
little fear that they will be embarrassed by some GATT body
finding them in violation of their international obligations
and commitments and recommending that they abandon or
alter what they are about to do.219
The typical working party report,220 which is supposed to
determine RIA compatibility with the GATT, is generally incon-
215. Gatt Chief Backs Regional Packs, FIN. TIMES, August 22, 1992, at 2.
216. McMillan, supra note 10, at 295-296.
217. GATT 1994, supra note 8, art. XXIV.
218. McMillan, supra note 10, at 297.
219. Gardner Patterson, Implications for the GATT and the World Trading Sys-
tem, in FREE TRADE AREAS AND U.S. TRADE POLICY (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 1989).
220. Working Parties are temporary bodies dealing with important issues when
they arise. They were established and guided by the GATT Council, now the Council
for Trade In Goods. The Working parties submitted their reports and conclusions to
the Council. Any interested member state was able to become a member of a work-
ing party. See LONG, supra note 15, at 49. The Understanding on Article XXIV,
supra note 207, provides in pertinent part:
All notifications made under Article XXIV:7(a) shall be examined
by a working party in the light of the relevant provisions of the
GATT 1994 and of paragraph 1 of this Understanding. The working
party shall submit a report to the Council for Trade in Goods on
its findings in this regard. The Council for Trade in Goods may
make such recommendations to Members as it deems appropriate.
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clusive. 2 '1 For example, a member of a GATT working party on
the Canada-United Free Trade Agreement was unable to con-
clude whether the agreement was consistent with GATT rules.
The party stated that "[t]he lack of definitive conclusions in
Article XXIV working party reports posed the danger of giving
carte blanche to participants in regional trade arrange-
ments." 222
Article XXIV requires a newly formed or expanding RIA to
not merely lower but eliminate substantially all intra-regional
trade restrictions between its members.223 In addition, the tar-
iffs and other regulations imposed upon all non-member states
must be no higher than the average level of pre-existing tariff
equivalents between the member countries 4.2  This rule may be
criticized on two grounds."5
First, the rule only concentrates on the tariffs which indi-
rectly affect trade volume and individual consumption. It makes
more sense to examine the RIA's effect on trade volumes which
have a more direct affect on welfare.226 As a result of its misdi-
rected focus "[i]t is possible for a RIA to be consistent with Arti-
cle XXJV in not raising average external tariffs, but to be harm-
ful to the rest of the world."227
When faced with the decision whether to allow or disallow a
RIA, the GATT has always tended to bend the rules or look the
other way.2 28 As one author noted, "because of this situation,
some in the international trading community have joked that
almost anything can be made 'GATT-able."'229 About one hun-
dred trade agreements have been presented to the GATT pursu-
221. John Whalley, Comments, in FREE TRADE AREAS AND U.S. TRADE POLICY,
supra note 219, at 366.
222. GATT Focus, Nov.- Dec. 1991, at 5.
223. GATT 1994, supra note 8, art. XXIV.
224. Id. at 35.
225. McMillan, supra note 10, at 298.
226. See HUFBAUER & SCHOTr, supra note 9, at 166-169. Hufbauer and Schott,
drawing on Professor McMillan's suggestions, have developed a four step economic
methodology, or test, for assessing trade diversion.
227. McMillan, supra note 10, at 299.
228. See Richard S. Bellous & Rebecca S. Hartley, Regional Trading Blocs: An
Introduction, in THE GROWTH OF REGIONAL TRADING BLOCS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY




ant to Article XXIV." ° In 1992 alone, eighteen agreements
were presented;"' Although no agreement has ever been spe-
cifically rejected as inconsistent with GATT provisions, "few
have [ever] been awarded the GATT seal of approval .... ,,22
The second criticism against raising average external tariffs
centers on its vagueness. Paragraph 5(a) of Article XXIV states
that external trade barriers "shall not on the whole be higher or
more restrictive than the general incidence of the duties and
regulations of commerce applicable in the constituent territories
prior to the formation of such union."233 The section does not,
however, specify how the "general incidence" of a set of tariffs
ought to be measured. Moreover, it fails to specify how tariff
increases are to be weighed against tariff reductions."34
This second criticism has been mitigated under the Uruguay
Round's revised formulation of Article XXIV. In the Understand-
ing on Article XXJV.' the Article was redrafted with more pre-
cise language.3 6 By continuing to focus admissibility criteria
on tariffs, however, the revisions do not overcome the first criti-
cism because RIAs are able to conform to GATT requirements
yet still considerably divert trade.
As previously suggested, Article XXIV could be more effec-
tive by phrasing its admissibility requirements in terms of trade
volumes, rather than tariff levels."' In order to receive WTO
approval, RIAs could not introduce any policies that would lower
external trade volumes. If, after some time, the RIA reduced its
imports from the rest of the world, then it would be required to
adjust its trade restrictions to make up for the fall in im-
230. See HUFBAUER & SCHOTr, supra note 9, at 162.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. GATT 1994, supra note 8, art. XXIV (emphasis supplied).
234. "Article XXIV gives no guidance at all ...on how to calculate whether in
net terms the integration has increased the barriers to external trade." McMillan,
supra note 10, at 298.
235. Understanding on Article XXIV, supra note 207, at 34.
236. Id.
237. McMillan acknowledges a possible disadvantage of focusing on trade volume
rather than on tariff levels. Analysts can only measure trade volumes after the RIA
has existed for a few years, while tariff levels are observable in advance. He notes,
however, that the potential effect of a RIA on trade volumes can be predicted using





The trade flow admissibility criterion possesses greater
advantages for the GATT system than the current Article XXIV
criteria. It is simply written - a crucial attribute of internation-
al rules - and validated by economic theory."' 9 By contrast,
the current GATT rule is far more complicated.
The key test for admissibility would focus on whether exter-
nal trade volumes are lower than they would have been in the
absence of the RIA. There are a vast multiplicity of factors
which cause trade volumes to change, including long-term eco-
nomic growth, short-term macro-economic fluctuations, techno-
logical change, and consumers' tastes. Analysts must filter out
these sources of change when analyzing trade volume.' 4 Many
econometric techniques are available to determine whether trade
policy or other factors caused a change in trade volume. 4' Par-
ties to a dispute concerning admissibility of a RIA can and
should be required to support their arguments using statistical
estimates of the RIA's effect on trade volume.242
C. Relation of the Dispute Resolution Mechanism to
Regional Integration Agreements
Paragraph twelve of the Understanding on Article XXIV
provides:
The provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII of the GATT 1994
as elaborated and applied by the Understanding on Rules
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes may be
invoked with respect to any matters arising from the applica-
tion of those provisions of Article XXIV relating to customs
unions, free trade areas, or interim agreements leading to the
238. Id. at 300.
239. Id. at 301-302.
240. Id. at 302.
241. Id.
242. McMillan notes that during the disputes about the enlargement of the EU,
"neither the EU nor the U.S. backed up their positions with rigorous, detailed em-
pirical studies." Id. at 304. In 1986, when Spain and Portugal joined the common
market, the EU argued that U.S. losses in agricultural exports would be fully offset
by gains in industrial exports. The EU offered no evidence to support its position.
Likewise, the U.S. refused to admit that any of its exports would be increased and
did not offer any data in support of its position. Id.
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formation of a customs union or free trade area.2"
The paragraph further provides that when a panel decides
that a RIA is in violation of Article XXIV, the RIA must take
corrective measures. If the RIA fails to do so, then the provisions
relating to compensation and suspension of concessions become
directly applicable.'"
The drafters of this Understanding apparently concluded
that what may be an effective DRM for disputes among individ-
ual nation states may also be an adequate means for resolving
disputes among RIAs. This conclusion, however, is flawed for
several reasons. First, the internal and external dynamics of
RIAs allow them to handle disputes with other RIA's differently
than disputes with individual states. As noted earlier, when
RIAs are in dispute they are less likely to engage in 'muscle-
flexing' because each party has more at stake. Thus, RIAs will
be more likely to accept an even stronger, rule-based DRM when
dealing with other RIAs that are viewed as fairly equal.2"
Second, the Understanding of 1993 permits the suspension
of concessions or other obligations by the complaining party
when the defending party has failed to comply with a panel
ruling.2" One can only imagine the ramifications of the EU
suspending concessions in retaliation for a non-compliance with
a ruling by the NAFTA, or even worse, by a Western
Hemisphere Free Trade Agreement. The consequences of such
an action would be devastating for the EU internally 7 and
could also have disastrous effects for the global trading order by
setting a possible precedent for hemispheric 'tit-for-tat' retalia-
tion. The conflict management system proposed in part V sug-
gests one way to avoid such retaliation.
243. Understanding on Article XXIV, supra note 207, at 36.
244. Id. See also Frederick M. Abbott, Integration Without Institutions: The
NAFTA Mutation of the EC Model and the Future of the GATT Regime, 40 AM. J.
COMP. L. 917, 947 (1992).
245. For example, if the EU is engaged in a subsidy dispute with a developing
country, the EU has little to fear because of the developing country's inability to
effectively retaliate. On the other hand, when faced with the threat of retaliation
from a formidable party such as the U.S., the EU may have a great deal more to
lose. Similarly, disputes between NAFTA and the EU will take on a different dy-
namic from nation versus nation disputes.
246. Understanding of 1993, supra note 67, at 126, § 22.2.
247. See Petersmann, supra note 179, at 473.
19951
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
As argued above, regional integration can not only foster
global trade, but can also impede it. Although changing Article
XXIV of the GATT, as suggested above or otherwise, will be a
good first step, it will not insure that RIAs do not harm the
global economy. It is inevitable that the deepening of RIAs will
result in criticism and opposition from other regional entities.
They will likely claim that the RIA in question is helping its
member states by making non-members worse off. A means
more effective than the Understanding of 1993 must be designed
and adopted to deal with these potential inter-regional dis-
putes.2" A RIA monitoring system must be put in place which
addresses potential disputes before they even reach the
DRM. 49
V. INTER-REGIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION
A. Introduction
This comment utilizes the European Union and the North
American Free Trade Agreement as examples to develop my
model of inter-regional cooperation and dispute resolution be-
cause they are the two largest and most politically and economi-
cally powerful RIAs. While the EU and NAFTA are diverse in
terms of their present-day institutional structures.. they are
248. McMillan has argued, "Regardless of what economists think of them, RIAs
are here to stay .... The relevant issue is not whether RIAs are a good thing per
se, but how to design international laws that ensure they are structured so as to
avoid harming the global economy." McMillan, supra note 10, at 306.
Professor Abbott has stated that the provisions of Article XXIV are "archaic"
because they do not "begin to address the more highly evolved forms of integration
taking place today" and, in general, do not inform the global community as to the
rights and obligations of regional organizations. Frederick M. Abbott, supra note 244,
at 947.
249. Hufbauer and Schott have suggested that:
[T]he GATT should institute rigorous multilateral monitoring of
preferential trading arrangements both to guard against opaque
protectionism hidden within trade rules or transition provisions
and to track the implementation of the pacts over time to insure
they do not harm the trade interests of third countries.
HUFBAUER AND SCHOTTr, supra note 9, at 162.
250. While the NAFTA is a free trade area (FTA) the EU is a customs union
(CU). NAFTA Article 101 entitled "Establishment of the Free Trade Area" provides:
"The parties to this Agreement, consistent with Article XXIV of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade, hereby establish a free trade area." Id.
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quite similar in terms of global economic importance.
One of the EU's goals is the harmonization of laws as "di-
rectly affecting the establishment or functioning of the common
market."25' The EUs accomplishments include the elimination
of intra-regional tariff barriers, action directed towards removal
of non-tariff barriers, removal of restrictions on movement of
persons, and directives effecting harmonization of various
regulations.2"2 Most importantly for this comment's proposed
model, the EU has pursued a common negotiating position with
regard to external trade.25'
The primary goal of the NAFTA on the other hand, is to
eventually eliminate tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade in
goods and to establish reciprocity requirements regarding trade
in services and investment."5 The agreement does not have as
one of its goals the progressive harmonization of internal laws
nor does it grant any institution the power to effectuate harmo-
nization. 5 Lack of central regional institutions with suprana-
tional authority within the NAFTA is certainly a problem when
attempting to create a working conflict management or dispute
resolution system between the two regimes. In the short term,
this problem can be circumvented by having the NAFTA states
themselves represent the NAFTA in the DRM agreement with
the EU. In the not-so-long term, NAFTA should develop the
central institutional power to conduct a very efficient conflict
management system with the EU.5 6 "The North American
For a good introduction to the theories of international economic integration
and the differences between the various regional integration schemes, see generally
MtROsLAv N. JOVANOVIC, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION (1992).
251. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (Treaty of Rome),
March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, art. 100.
252. See Abbott, supra note 244, at 947.
253. Id. In addition to expressly granted external powers, the EU possesses
whatever external powers are necessary in order to implement an internal policy ef-
fectively. DAVID O'KEEFE & PATRICK M. TWOMEY, LEGAL ISSUES OF THE MAASTRICHT
TREATY 249 (1994). External powers under the EU's common commercial policy may
extend beyond the fields expressly mentioned in Article 113 of the EEC Treaty to
cover new aspects of commercial policy reflecting changing conditions in World
Trade. Id.
254. See O'KEEFE & TwOMEY, supra note 253.
255. Id. at 250.
256. The NAFTA Free Trade Commission, a trilateral institution composed of
cabinet-level representatives of the Parties or their designees, is vested with broad
authority to resolve disputes, function in a supervisory capacity over NAFTA commit-
tees, and oversee the implementation and further elaboration of the Agreement.
1995] 603
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
Free Trade Agreement should... evolve toward the [EU] struc-
ture as the inadequacies of the more limited structures now
envisioned become apparent.""7
A common assumption is that a customs union such as the
EU, because of its deeper level of integration than a free trade
area such as the NAFTA, is more likely to become a "fortress" -
a trading bloc with high barriers for outsiders. 58 This is not
accurate. A FTA is much more likely to be an impediment to
external trade than a customs union such as the EU because it
is more likely to be trade diverting."9 The reason for this is
that the FTA gives preferences to goods originating within its
boundaries, rather than granting the benefit of free circulation
once within the tariff wall, as a Customs Union does.""
B. NAFTA-EU Model of Conflict Management: A Combined
Trade Policy Review and Dispute Resolution Mechanism
A combination of a TPRM and a DRM (TPR-DRM) in the
context of NAFTA-EU relations would serve to eliminate many
of the current weaknesses of the respective mechanisms. Addi-
tionally, it would also enhance the potential of each mechanism's
strengths and maximize compliance with WTO rules.
The shortcomings of the TPRM within the GATT would be
eliminated in the context of the NAFTA-EU mechanism in sever-
al ways. First, review of EU and NAFTA trade policies could be
NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2001(1), (2). See David S. Huntington, Settling Disputes
under the North American Free Trade Agreement, 34 HARVARD INT'L L.J. 407, 415
(1993). The Commission may eventually be vested with the power to act as NAFTA's
representative to the WTO.
257. Abbott, Integration Without Institutions, supra note 244, at 919. Professor
Abbott labels this phenomenon as "juridical and institutional evolution based on
social and technological evolution." Id. at 920. He reasons that the lack of a coordi-
nated external trade policy will lead to political tension and a propensity to disinte-
gration. Abbott, NAFTA and the Future of United States-European Community Trade
Relations, supra note 5, at 525. He argues that if the NAFTA parties do not develop
a coordinated, external policy, it is very likely that "the United States, Canada, and
Mexico will individually seek to attract inward investment and outward market
openings through the grant of special incentives applicable to each country's respec-
tive territory." Id. This sort of competition will result in political strain within
NAFTA and threaten the long-term viability of the agreement. Id.





conducted bi-annually by, for example, a consortium of the re-
spective RIAs' trade representations mediated by a rotating
panel of three individuals chosen from the superpanel.26' In
addition, it would not be difficult to decide how often to conduct
the review or to evaluate the criteria for making that decision
because schedules would be set in advance. There would be the
possibility of calling an emergency session if, for example, a six
month delay in the review of a new policy to be implemented
immediately would cause undue problems that might be avoided
by way of the review process.
The most important aspect of the TPRM in this context is
that its goal would be enforcement, not transparency. Transpar-
ency would be achieved, but only as a step in the enforcement
process. If the NAFTA and the EU engage in the mediated poli-
cy review process suggested above, and the panel decides that
one of the RIAs is being unreasonable in refusing to compromise
on an impending policy clearly violative of WTO rules, the panel
may transfer the proceedings to the tribunal discussed below.
Dealing with two parties would greatly facilitate the work-
ing of the system and would expedite the entire process. The
NAFTA states and the EU would establish a fund to which each
RIA would contribute an equal amount to pay for the function-
ing of this dispute resolution system.
The trade policy review aspect of the mechanism would, at
its best, work to nip any potential dispute in the bud. It would
allow each party to voice their disapproval with a particular
policy objective and allow the possibility of a compromise before
actual implementation. If a particular trade policy compromise
is reached, it must not to abridge the obligations of the NAFTA
states or the EU vis-&-vis other WTO members and could not
abridge the rights of other WTO members. For example, if the
EU were to complain that a proposed trade policy in furtherance
of NAFTA integration has lowered trade volume vis-a-vis the
EU, the EU and NAFTA could reach a compromise. This might
be accomplished by making a particular sector of trade more
accessible to compensate for barriers in another sector. However,
any concessions which the NAFTA would make as a result of
this compromise would have to be extended to all affected par-




As noted above, in contrast with the current TPRM, the goal
of this mechanism will not only be transparency, but primarily
enforcement. If a particular disputed policy goes into effect be-
cause a compromise was not reached on an earlier date, or be-
cause the panel did not transfer the dispute directly to the next
stage, the complaining party could turn to the dispute resolution
aspect of the mechanism. The EU and the NAFTA would agree
on the composition of a standing tribunal or adjudicative body at
the inception of the mechanism and would also agree on the
terms to be served by its judges. They may adopt the Uruguay
Round idea of a superpanel,262 an agreed upon body of suitable
judges, from which the new judges could be appointed.
The mechanism would be rule-oriented. It would be based
on adjudication for the most part, and to a much lesser extent
on negotiation. Negotiation would play a role in the TPRM stage
where the two RIAs seek to reach a compromise as to the trade
policy to be implemented. The two parties would agree that rul-
ings of the tribunal would be final and the correction of the
violation would be implemented within a time frame decided by
the tribunal except under the most unusual circumstances, such
as a regional emergency. The tribunal would allot time for cor-
rection of violations based on relevant factors suggested by both
parties. Since the NAFTA and the EU would be operating on the
assumption that they are on a fairly equal political-economic
footing, each would realize that it is in their own self interest to
comply with the ruling of the inter-regional tribunal.
The NAFTA-EU mechanism would also deal with the prob-
lem of enforcement differently from the current DRM. It would
not put the option of retaliation for non-compliance with tribu-
nal rulings in the hands of the RIA.263 The ultimate goal of the
262. See Understanding of 1993, supra note 67, at 119, § 8.4.
263. While the Understanding of 1993, § 22.4 provides that "the level of suspen-
sion of concessions or other obligations authorized by the DSB shall be equivalent to
the level of nullification and impairment," as the EC-U.S. oilseeds dispute demon-
strated it is difficult for parties to agree on what exactly the level of impairment is.
In addition, although the Understanding of 1993 attempts to set specific guidelines
for the determination of what concessions to suspend, it leaves a great deal of room
for the exercise of obviously biased discretion by the complaining party. For example,
a complaining party must first attempt to suspend concessions in the same sector in
which the panel has found a violation. If the complaining party decides that it is
[Vol. 26:3606
DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEMS
system would be specific performance but, unlike the WTO sys-
tem, it would require the violating party to pay a heavy fine as
soon the tribunal ruled on the dispute. This sum would actually
be a bond of sorts, held in escrow. Once the party complied with
the ruling, the monies paid would be reimbursed.
After sixty days, the tribunal would hold a surveillance
hearing. If it found that the violating RIA unreasonably delayed
compliance with the ruling, it would turn the escrowed funds
over to the complaining party as compensation. The extremely
costly fine would, of course, serve as something akin to a puni-
tive damage award which would arguably have a deterrent effect
on non-compliance.
Those who support the anti-legalist approach to dispute
resolution may argue that the above enforcement provisions will
be unnecessary in the scope of inter-regional conflict manage-
ment. They might maintain that the use of such drastic sanc-
tions against an RIA would be too risky, chancing the possibility
that a RIA will exit the WTO rather than pay the heavy bond.
There is always the possibility that a member RIA will
choose to exit the organization rather than conform with a given
rule or tribunal decision. In the context of the proposed inter-
regional TPR-DRM, however, the price that an RIA will have to
pay to exit the WTO will probably be much higher, in the long-
run, than paying a heavy fine or conforming its foreign trade
policy to WTO rules. In addition, there is a much greater likeli-
hood that parties will not conform to tribunal rulings under an
anti-legalist, negotiated approach based strictly on compro-
mise."2 The slight probability that a member RIA will exit the
WTO is a reasonable price to ensure compliance with rules that
are essential for the successful functioning of the system.
"not practicable" to do so, then it may suspend concessions in another sector. See id.
§ 22.3(c).
264. In addition, since internal RIA governments are more limited in their dis-
cretion with a legalist mechanism, they are better able to insulate themselves from
domestic/regional politics. While constituencies will still attempt to pressure their
respective governments, "that pressure is likely to be more closely linked to the legal
issues involved." Huntington, supra note 256, at 427 n.149.
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1. Problems of Implementation
Putting aside the problem of attaining a unified NAFTA
external trade policy, the main problem with implementing this
NAFTA-EU TPR-DRM would arise from the internal politics of
each party. In the U.S., policy makers would have to be sold on
the idea of giving up further national sovereignty within the
context of NAFTA, vis-&-vis the EU. Although Congress ap-
proved U.S. membership in the WTO, debates on the issue of
sovereignty dominated the Senate floor for twenty hours before
the final vote on December 1, 1994."
While gaining congressional approval will be no easy task,
the need for inter-regional cooperation for the development of
the global trading system, as well as the realization that the
TPR-DRM is in the economic self-interest of all parties to the
agreement, should prevail over the unwillingness to cede sover-
eignty. Government policy makers both in the NAFTA states
and in the EU will realize that in an interdependent global
economy sovereignty is not an us-or-them proposition. Effective
intergovernmental institutions will not subvert the achievement
of national will. They will promote it through international coop-
eration.
2. Improvements on the Current Dispute Resolution
Mechanism
The current DRM as embodied in the Understanding of
19936 makes no distinct reference to inter-regional relation-
ships in the context of dispute resolution. In the most basic
sense, it does not offer separate guidelines for the very sensitive
disputes which may arise under Article XXIV, as discussed earli-
265. Senate Republican leader Robert Dole initially voiced concerns about
whether the WTO posed a threat to U.S. sovereignty. He struck a last minute deal
with President Clinton, however, that provided for an "escape hatch" for the U.S. to
exit the WTO if Congress were to believe that the WTO was treading on U.S.
rights. This compromise helped insure Senate approval. Major opposition to the U.S.
approval of the new trade organization was voiced by labor unions including the
AFL-CIO, especially textile worker unions. See Helene Cooper & John Harwood, The
Vote on GATT - The Rules Change, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 1994, at Al; WASH. POST,
Dec. 2, 1994, at Al, A26.




The mechanism proposed above will allow disputes to be
resolved amicably which might otherwise have transformed into
the precursors of inter-regional trade war. Inherent to the re-
view process of the proposed mechanism would be an examina-
tion of the recent steps taken by the RIA towards deeper inte-
gration in the context of ramifications for the WTO. Such a re-
view might consist of an econometric analysis of the potential
effect on external trade.
As the new conflict management system comes into greater
use and tribunal rulings are handed down, RIA foreign policy
makers would, sua sponte, give greater scrutiny to proposed
policies. They would realize the futility of introducing foreign
policy which would likely be struck down in the process of the
TPR-DRM. The adoption of a rule-violative foreign policy provi-
sion by a RIA will involve a cost-benefit analysis. Due to the
almost prohibitive cost of violating a WTO rule, the countervail-
ing benefit will have to be extremely high for the RIA to adopt
the violative provision.
3. Potential Benefit To World Trading Order
The conflict management model proposed within the context
of NAFTA-EU relations would obviously not be limited to just
those two parties. As regionalism expands, any RIA that would
be willing to comply with the stringent rule-based TPR-DRM
would be permitted to participate in the mechanism. While there
could be multiple complaining parties, there could only be one
defending party for each claim that is brought, thus eliminating
the potential complications of the proposed TPR-DRM within the
context of participation by a greater number of RIAs.
As the regional structuralization of the world continued, the
WTO would allow the ten or so parties to which its membership
would be reduced2" to communicate and develop any new rules
267. Understanding on Article XXIV, supra note 207, at 34. While the Under-
standing on Article XXIV provides that the Understanding of 1993 applies to dis-
putes regarding RIAs, as argued earlier, it is flawed for precisely this reason.
268. Professor Abbott has similarly suggested that "regionalization could benefit
the GATT if the 100 plus contracting parties are reduced to 12 [RIAs] with negotiat-
ing authority for their members." See Abbott, supra note 244, at 947.
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which might be necessary to accommodate its new organization-
al structure.269 Communication among ten parties is inherently
much easier than among the more than one hundred current
WTO members.27 These regional entities would thus become
the building blocks of a global free trade system.
In addition, because of the strength of the rule-based mech-
anism proposed above, as well as the consequences of non-com-
pliance in the inter-regional system, parties would almost al-
ways comply with tribunal decisions. This inter-regional organi-
zation in its final form will facilitate what the original founders
of the GATT had dreamed of: a world market with no bound-
aries and no frontiers.
URI LITvAK*
269. This does not intend to suggest that regional integration would be forced on
any nation-state member of the WTO which did not wish to become part of an RIA.
This structure of the WTO would accommodate regionalism rather than force it on
the world. The RIA members would be able to coexist with the nation-state members
within the new framework of the WTO.
270. One author has argued that "the biggest obstacle to a smoothly functioning
[WTO] is the incompatibility of institutions that characterize the economies of main
participants." She points to the divergence of Japanese and American/European views
regarding the purpose of economic activity including free trade. See Karen van
Wolferen, supra note 115. For a detailed discussion of these fundamental differences
and the general U.S.-Japan conflict that threatens the existing multilateral system
and would similarly threaten the inter-regional system in the future, see C. FRED
BERGSTEN & MARcus NOLAND, RECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES? UNITED STATES-JAPAN
ECONOMIC CONFLICT (1993).
A smaller WTO membership would also serve to ameliorate these problems
by allowing the members to compromise as to economic institutional structure.
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